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HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONFLICT

Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, I it was well
established that certain out-of-court statements made by a member of a
conspiracy were admissible at trial against a coconspirator under an exception to the hearsay rule. 2 This coconspirator exception originally
1. FED. R. EVID. 101-1103. The Federal Rules of Evidence were signed into
lawJanuary 2, 1975, and became effective 180 days thereafter. Pub. L. No. 93595 § 2, 88 Stat. 1926 (1974).
2. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1974). The Anderson
Court noted that "[tihe doctrine that declarations of one conspirator may be
used against another conspirator, if the declaration was made during the course
of and in furtherance of the conspiracy charged, is a well-recognized exception
to the hearsay rule which would otherwise bar the introduction of such out-ofcourt declarations." Id. at 218. See generally Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy: A Reexaminationof the Co-Conspirators'Exceptionto the Hearsay Rule, 52 MICH. L. REV. 1159
(1954); Comment, The Hearsay Exceptionfor Co-Conspirators'Declarations,25 U. CHI.
L. REV. 530 (1958).

(1565)
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was rationalized in the context of an agency theory of conspiracy. 3
Courts reasoned that coconspirators, like partners, were liable for each
other's acts and statements. 4 Thus, a statement by one conspirator
could be used to implicate all other members of the conspiracy.
Although the agency model of conspiracy was dismissed by the
drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence as "a fiction, ' 5 they chose to
6
adopt the coconspirator hearsay rule as it had existed at common law.
Commentators have attempted to explain the continued use of the rule
by noting that it is justified by the difficulties of proving conspiracy at
trial. 7 It has been asserted that the very essence of any conspiracy-an
agreement to commit an illegal act 8-necessitates secrecy. 9 Because
such secret agreements rarely are provable by other than circumstantial
evidence, it is maintained that relaxation of the hearsay rule is warranted
3. United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460, 468-70 (1827). Gooding involved a prosecution for a violation of the Slave Trade Act. Id. at 461. The
first issue the Court decided was whether incriminating out-of-court statements
by the captain of a ship engaged in transporting slaves were properly admissible
against the owner of the ship. Id. at 468-70. The Court permitted the admission
of the statements, reasoning that a principal is responsible for the authorized
acts of his agents in criminal as well as civil proceedings. Id. at 469. The Court
concluded that "in cases of conspiracy and riot, when once the conspiracy or
combination is established, the act of one conspirator, in the prosecution of the
enterprise, is considered the act of all, and is evidence against all." Id. For a
discussion of the development of the agency theory of conspiracy, see Levie,
supra note 2, at 1163-65.
4. Van Riper v. United States, 13 F.2d 961, 967 (1926). In Van Riper, Judge
Learned Hand stated, "When men enter an agreement for an unlawful end, they
become ad hoc agents for one another, and have made 'a partnership in crime.'
What one does pursuant to their common purpose, all do, and, as declarations
may be such acts, they are competent against all." Id. (citing Hitchman C. & C.
Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229, 249 (1917)).
5. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee note. The Advisory Committee observed that although rule 801 (d) (2) (D), which excludes statements by a
party's agent from the definition of hearsay, expanded the evidentiary view of
agency, "the agency theory of conspiracy is at best a fiction and ought not to
serve as a basis for admissibility beyond that already established." Id.
6. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E). For a further discussion of the federal enactment of the conspirator hearsay rule, see infra notes 20-21 and accompanying
text.
7. Levie, supra note 2, at 1166 (there is "great probative need" for coconspirators declarations); Comment, supra note 2, at 540 ("admission of co-conspirators' hearsay declarations is justified by necessity"). It also has been
asserted that the coconspirator hearsay rule has been perpetuated by prosecutors because it makes criminal convictions easier to obtain. R. LEMPERT & S.
SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 378 (1977).
8. Ianelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 (1975) ("Conspiracy is an inchoate offense, the essence of which is an agreement to commit an unlawful
act.").
9. Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U.S. 539, 557 (1947). In Blumenthal,
the Court observed, "Secrecy and concealment are essential features of successful conspiracy. The more completely they are achieved, the more successful the
crime." Id.
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to facilitate successful prosecution of cases involving conspiracy.' 0
Although there is a strong public policy favoring evidentiary rules
which facilitate the use of relevant testimony in the prosecution of criminal proceedings,"I the Supreme Court of the United States consistently
has interpreted the sixth amendment's confrontation clause to require
that only trustworthy evidence be admissible against a criminal defendant. 12 The Court has identified two categories of evidence that qualify
as trustworthy. The first is evidence that is subject to cross-examination
at trial.' 3 The second is evidence that is inherently trustworthy because
it bears sufficient indicia of reliability. 14 When out-of-court statements
10. Levie, supra note 2, at 1159-61, 1166; Comment, supra note 2, at 540.
Necessity generally is asserted as the only rational basis for the continued use of
the coconspirator hearsay rule. Levie, supra note 2, at 1166. There is "great
probative need" for coconspirator declarations at trial, because conspiracy is difficult to prove. Id. Reliance on circumstantial evidence to prove an illegal
agreement poses several problems for prosecutors:
Typically, the jury is asked to draw an inference of agreement from conduct which seems to be following some plan. But such use of circumstantial hypothesis is subject to inherent limitations. If the conspiracy
is apprehended early or discontinued there is little conduct from which
to draw the inference. Besides, alternative explanations of whatever
conduct there was may exist and make it difficult to prove guilt beyond
all reasonable doubt.
Id. at 1160.
In addressing the difficulties of proving conspiracy, courts have emphasized
that conspiratorial conduct must be deterred because it poses a serious threat to
society. See United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915). In Rabinowich,
the Court observed:
For two or more to confederate and combine together to commit or
cause to be committed a breach of the criminal laws, is an offense of the
gravest character, sometimes quite outweighing, in injury to the public,
the mere commission of the contemplated crime. It involves deliberate
plotting to subvert the laws, educating and preparing the conspirators
for further and habitual criminal practices. And it is characterized by
secrecy, rendering it difficult of detection, requiring more time for its
discovery, and adding to the importance of punishing it when
discovered.
Id.
11. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980) (noting that every jurisdiction has a strong interest in developing rules of evidence to promote effective
law enforcement).
12. See, e.g., id. at 65-66 (purpose of confrontation clause is to bolster accuracy of fact finding process). For a further discussion of the Supreme Court's
requirement of trustworthiness, see infra notes 153-200 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 164 (1970) (out-of-court
hearsay statements may be admissible in compliance with confrontation clause if
declarant is available for cross-examination).
14. See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970) (hearsay statement that
was not subject to cross-examination held admissible in compliance with the
confrontation clause because it bore sufficient indicia of reliability). For a further discussion of the indicia of reliability considered sufficient to meet the confrontation clause's requirements, see infra notes 179-200 and accompanying
text.
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are introduced into evidence by a third party under an exception to the
hearsay rule, they must meet this second test of trustworthiness because
the statements are not subject to cross-examination. 15
Currently there is a split among the federal courts of appeals over
the question of whether statements admitted under the federal version
of the coconspirator hearsay rule meet the confrontation clause's requirement of reliability. 16 This comment traces the development of the
rule as it has been applied by the various federal courts of appeals, attempts to identify the guarantees of reliability that exist with respect to
evidence admitted under the rule, and traces the Supreme Court's interpretation of the confrontation clause to its current status. In addition,
this comment sets forth the split among the circuits over the application
of the confrontation clause to the coconspirator hearsay rule, and suggests a resolution to this conflict.
II.

THE COCONSPIRATOR HEARSAY RULE-FEDERAL RULE

OF EVIDENCE

801(d)(2)(E)

Article VIII of the Federal Rules of Evidence contains the federal
codification of the hearsay rule and its exceptions.1 7 Hearsay is defined
therein as any out-of-court statement offered "to prove the truth of the
matter asserted."' 18 Unless an exception to the hearsay rule applies,
15. See Garland & Snow, The Co-Conspirators Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule:
ProceduralImplementation and Confrontation Clause Requirements, 63 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 1, 3-4, 14-15 (1972).
16. Sanson v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3559 (1984) (White,J, dissenting
from denial of certiorari), denying cert. to 727 F.2d 1 13 (7th Cir. 1984).
17. FED. R. EVlD. 801-806. Article VIII of the Federal Rules adopts the
common law approach of creating a general prohibition against hearsay, and
then carving out exceptions to the rule. FED. R. EvID. art. VIII advisory committee note. The hearsay exceptions are contained in two rules. One applies to
situations in which the declarant is unavailable to testify, and the other applies to
situations in which the availability of the declarant is immaterial. FED. R. EvID.
803 (availability immaterial); FED. R. EvID. 804 (declarant must be unavailable).
However, the Federal Rules diverge from the common law in defining hearsay.
Certain kinds of statements that had been considered hearsay at common law
and treated as exceptions to the hearsay rules are specifically excluded from the
definition of hearsay under the Federal Rules. See FED. R. EvID. 801(d) ("Statements which are not hearsay."). See also 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 411 (1980); S.SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, FEDERAL RULES OF EviDENCE MANUAL 496-98 (3d ed. 1982).
18. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). Rule 801 provides in pertinent part:
The following definitions apply under this article:
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written assertion
or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is intended by him as an
assertion.
(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a statement.
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence
to prove the truth of the matter asserted.
FED.

R.

EVID. 801.
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hearsay statements are not admissible into evidence.'

9

However, the

Federal Rules of Evidence classify certain statements made by coconspirators as party admissions, excluding them from the rules' definition
of hearsay. 20 Accordingly, under rule 801(d)(2)(E), an out-of-court
statement offered against a member of a conspiracy is admissible if it
was made by a coconspirator "during the course.and in furtherance of
the conspiracy.''21
19. FED. R. EVID. 802. Rule 802 provides in pertinent part: "Hearsay is not
admissible except as provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the
Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of Congress." Id. Exceptions to the hearsay rule are set forth in rules 803 and 804. Certain other
statements that would be hearsay under rule 801 (c) are excluded from the definition of hearsay by rule 801(d), and are therefore admissible at trial. FED. R.
EvID. 801(d). Some exceptions to the hearsay rule also are found outside the
Federal Rules of Evidence. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 32 (admissibility of depositions at trial); FED. R. CRIM. P. 4(a) (admissibility of affidavits to show grounds
for issuing warrants); 29 U.S.C. § 161(4) (1982) (admissibility of affidavits as
proof of service in National Labor Relations Board proceedings).
20. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E). For the text of rule 801(d)(2)(E), see infra
note 21. The Advisory Committee reasoned that party admissions are omitted
from the definition of hearsay under the Federal Rules on the theory that a party
may not object to statements he has made or caused to be made. See FED. R.
EvID. 801 (d) (2) advisory committee note; S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note
17, at 501. The Committee further reasoned that although admissions provide
little guarantee of trustworthiness, they are admissible because of the requirements of the adversary system. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2) advisory committee
note. In addition, rule 801(d)(2)(E) is a departure from the agency theory of
admission for coconspirators' statements. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory
committee note. On the other hand, rules 803 and 804 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence create exceptions to the hearsay rule for statements that meet a minimum standard for trustworthiness. See FED. R. EvID. 803 advisory committee
note ("under appropriate circumstances a hearsay statement may possess circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness"); FED. R. EVlD. 804(b) advisory committee note (hearsay testimony may be admitted "if the declarant is unavailable
and if his statement meets a specified standard"). For a discussion of the trustworthiness of coconspirators' statements, see infra notes 202-24 & 236-52 and
accompanying text.
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, federal courts
treated coconspirators' statements as exceptions to the hearsay rule. See, e.g.,
Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1973) (coconspirator hearsay
rule is a "well recognized exception to the hearsay rule"). It was originally
thought that redefining coconspirators' statements as "not hearsay," rather than
creating an exception to the hearsay rule, would have little practical effect on the
admissibility of the statements. S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 17, at
501. This distinction, however, recently has been cited in determining whether
admission of a coconspirator's statement violated the sixth amendment's confrontation clause. See United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 255 (3d Cir.) (rationale for admission of coconspirator's statement under rule 801(d)(2)(E)
differs from the rationale for admission of exceptions to the hearsay rule under
rules 803 and 804), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 344 (1983). But see United States v.
Smith, 578 F.2d 1227, 1231 n.6 (8th Cir. 1978) (under Federal Rules of Evidence "distinction between a statement which is not hearsay and a statement
which is an exception to the hearsay rule is semantic and not outcome
determinative").
21. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E). Rule 801(d)(2)(E) provides that "[a] state-
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Prerequisitesto Admission under Rule 801(d)(2)(E)

Courts have interpreted rule 801(d) (2) (E) to require that an offering party satisfy three criteria before a coconspirator's statement is admitted into evidence. The offering party must demonstrate (1) that a
ment is not hearsay if... (2) [t]he statement is offered against a party and is ...
(E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of the conspiracy." Id. In adopting this provision, the Senate stated that it
was enacting the "long-accepted" rule governing the admission of coconspirators' statements, and determining that such statements are not considered hearsay. FED. R. EvID. 801 note of Senate Committee on the Judiciary. For a
discussion of the difference between the coconspirator rule applied under the
Federal Rules of Evidence and at common law, see generally Recent Development, Evolution of the CoconspiratorException to the Hearsay Rule in the Federal Courts,
16 NEw ENG. L. REV. 617 (1981).
It has been noted that rule 801(d)(2)(E) is the most frequently cited provision of article VIII of the Federal Rules of Evidence. D. LouISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 17, § 427, at 331.
It should be recognized that if an out-of-court declaration by a coconspirator constitutes a verbal act, it is not necessary to assert rule 801(d)(2)(E)
when offering that declaration into evidence. S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra
note 17, at 502-03. A verbal act is a statement that affects the legal rights of a
party at trial merely because of the fact that the statement was made. See FED. R.
EvID. 801 (c) advisory committee note. The statement itself constitutes a legally
significant act, and when introduced into evidence it is not considered to be

offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted. Id. Verbal acts are admissible
at trial because they fall outside the purview of hearsay as defined in rule 801 (c).
Id. In the context of a conspiracy proceeding, statements that constitute acts of
the conspiracy have independent legal significance and are admissible as verbal
acts without reference to rule 801(d) (2) (E). See, e.g., Anderson v. United States,
417 U.S. 211,219-22 (1974) (false testimony that proved existence of conspiracy
and defendants' motive in voting fraud prosecution was not introduced for truth
of the matter asserted and therefore was not hearsay); United States v. Romano,
684 F.2d 1057, 1066 (2d Cir.) (in prosecution for conspiracy to violate racketeering statute (RICO), requests to give money to "the boys in the union" were
admissible as "utterances contemporaneous with an independently admissible
nonverbal act"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1016 (1982); United States v. Bruner, 657
F.2d 1278, 1284-85 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (prescription forms offered in trial for conspiracy to distribute narcotics were held admissible because they were offered as
proof of means of obtaining drugs and not to prove truth of assertions contained in them). Although the range of statements that could be classified as

verbal acts of a conspiracy is very broad, at least one commentator has suggested
that the category must be narrowly construed:
In the final analysis, there are really only three types of cocon-

spirator declarations that can justifiably be considered "acts" in these
cases: the statements of the conspirators to each other that constitute
the conspiracy itself (i.e., the agreement to commit the criminal act and

the planning of that act), any statements to others that would themselves constitute a crime (such as one conspirator's offer of a bribe as
part of the group's plans), and any statements that are properly admis-

sible under the substantive law of conspiracy as "overt acts" of the
conspiracy.

Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-ConspiratorException in Criminal Prosecutions: A FunctionalAnalysis, 85 HARv. L. REV. 1378 (1972).
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conspiracy existed, and that both the declarant 22 and the defendant
were members of that conspiracy; 23 (2) that the statements offered were
made "during the course" of the conspiracy; 24 and (3) that the state25
ments were made "in furtherance" of the conspiracy.
Aside from the guarantees of the confrontation clause, these three
prerequisites to admissibility under rule 801(d)(2)(E) stand as the only
means of safeguarding the reliability of coconspirators' statements that
are admitted into evidence. 2 6 These prerequisites were developed primarily as assurances that coconspirators' statements would be admitted
in compliance with principals of agency law. 2 7 For example, the requirements that a statement be made "during the course and in furtherance
of a conspiracy" are analogous to the scope-of-employment requirement
for liability under respondeat superior.28 Similarly, the requirement that an
underlying conspiracy be proved precedent to admission of a conspirator's statement parallels the idea that agency may not be proved on the
word of an agent alone. 29 The following sections will explore the devel22. FED. R. EVID. 801(b). A "declarant" is defined as "a person who makes
a statement." Id.
23. For a discussion of the requirement of membership in the conspiracy,
see infra notes 33-37 and accompanying text.
24. For a discussion of the requirement that statements be made "during
the course" of the conspiracy, see infra notes 117-36 and accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of the "in furtherance" requirement, see infra notes
137-52 and accompanying text.
26. See Davenport, supra note 21, at 1385-91. Davenport argues that the
prerequisites to admission of a coconspirator's statement are inadequate assurances of reliability. Id.
27. Levie, supra note 2, at 1161. Levie notes that "[a]ll three conditions of
admissibility [for coconspirators'

statements] . . . resemble principles of

agency." Id. These prerequisites to admissibility were well established prior to
the enactment of rule 801(d)(2)(E). See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,
701 & n.14 (1974); Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1974);
Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 442-43 (1949). However, the interpretation of these prerequisites has changed drastically since the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. See 4 D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 17,
§ 427; S. SALTZBURG & K. REDDEN, supra note 17, at 502-12; 4J. WEINSTEIN & M.
BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 801(d)(2)(E)[01], at 801-233 to -249 (1984);
Kessler, The Treatment of PreliminaryIssues of Fact in Conspiracy Litigations: Putting the
Conspiracy Back into the CoconspiratorRule, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 77, 88-89 (1976);
Marcus, Co-ConspiratorDeclarations: The Federal Rules of Evidence and Other Recent
Developments, From a Criminal Law Perspective, 7 AM. J. CRIM. L. 287, 290-307
(1979); Comment, Co-conspiratorDeclarations. Procedureand Standardof Prooffor Admission Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, 55 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 577 (1979); Recent Development, supra note 21; Note, Inconsistencies in the Federal Circuit Courts'
Application of the Co-ConspiratorException, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 125 (1972).
28. Levie, supra note 2, at 1161, 1167-68. See also FED. R. EVID.

801 (d)(2)(D) (authorizing admission against principal of statements made by his
agent "concerning a matter within the scope of his agency.., made during the
existence of the relationship").
29. Levie, supra note 2, at 1176. Most federal courts require that an underlying conspiracy be proved by the use of independent, nonhearsay evidence
before a statement is admitted under rule 801(d)(2)(E). Id. For a further discus-
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opment of rule 801 (d) (2) (E)'s foundational prerequisites, and the assurances of reliability they provide as they have been applied by the federal
courts.
1. Existence of the Conspiracy
Proving the existence of a conspiracy is the most crucial foundational element of rule 801 (d) (2) (E), because it is a precondition to proving the other two elements.3 0 Whether acts of a conspirator will be
deemed to have occurred "during the course of" or "in furtherance of"
a conspiracy will necessarily depend upon proof of the underlying
event. 31 When stringent standards must be met to demonstrate the
existence of a conspiracy, there is a diminished likelihood that statements made outside the parameters of the conspiracy will be admitted
32
into evidence.
The rule requires the offering party to prove the existence of the
conspiracy and to link the conspiracy to both the declarant and the defendant.3 3 However, the rule does not require a quantum of proof suffi34
cient to convict the defendant of the substantive crime of conspiracy.
For the purposes of rule 801(d)(2)(E), conspiracy means only that the
declarant and the defendant were engaged in ajoint enterprise.3 5 Thus,
sion of the requirement of independent proof of conspiracy, see infra notes 97116 and accompanying text.
30. See United States v. Gil, 604 F.2d 546, 547 (7th Cir. 1979) ("existence
of a conspiracy is an obvious necessary precondition before [rule 801(d)(2)(E)]
comes into play").
31. Recent Development, supra note 21, at 620-21. It is not possible to
prove that a statement was made in furtherance or during the course of a conspiracy without proof of the conspiracy itself. Id.
32. For a discussion of the burden of proof required to establish the existence of a conspiracy, see infra notes 46-71 and accompanying text. For an analysis of the "independent evidence" requirement, see infra notes 97-116 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of the confrontation clause and its concomittant preoccupation with the reliability of evidence, see infra notes 153-224
and accompanying text.
33. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1942) (coconspirators'
statements are only admissible if there is proof aliunde of conspiracy and of defendant's connection to it); United States v. Ordonez, 737 F.2d 793, 801 (9th
Cir. 1984) (otherwise inadmissible hearsay statements of coconspirators are admissible when there is independent proof of both existence of conspiracy and
connection of declarant and defendant to it); United States v. Lyles, 593 F.2d
182, 195 (2d Cir.) (under rule 801(d)(2)(E) government must show conspiratorial relationship between parties), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 972 (1979).
34. United States v. Gil, 604 F.2d 546, 548-49 (7th Cir. 1979). Conspiracy
as an evidentiary principle and conspiracy as a substantive crime are not the
same. Id. Conspiracy as a crime includes "elements such as meeting of the
minds, criminal intent and, where required by statute, an overt act." United
States v. Trowery, 542 F.2d 623, 626 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104
(1977).
35. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(E) note of Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
The Senate committee reasoned that while rule 801(d)(2)(E) "refers to a coconspirator," the committee understood "that the rule is meant to carry forward the
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the rule may be invoked against coconspirators 36 in a judicial proceed37
ing even though the crime of conspiracy has not been charged.
Although proof of the existence of a conspiracy is a uniformly accepted prerequisite to the admission of coconspirators' statements
under rule 801(d)(2)(E), the standards and criteria used to make this
foundational determination vary significantly among the federal circuits. 38 Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, proof
of the foundational requirements of the coconspirator hearsay rule generally was submitted to the jury for a determination of admissibility. 3 9
universally accepted doctrine that a joint venturer is considered as a coconspirator for the purposes of this rule." Id.
36. United States v. Anderton, 679 F.2d 1199, 1202-03 (5th Cir. 1982).
Coconspirator statements may only be offered against a party to a conspiracy. Id.
at 1202. A conspirator may not use rule 801(d)(2)(E) to introduce evidence in
his own behalf. Id. at 1203.
37. United States v. Kiefer, 694 F.2d 1109, 1112 n.2 (8th Cir. 1982) ("a
defendant need not be charged with the crime of conspiracy to involve the
coconspirator exception") (citing United States v. Miller, 644 F.2d 1241, 1244
n.5 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 850 (1981)); United States v. McManaman,
606 F.2d 919, 926-27 (10th Cir. 1979) (statements of unindicted coconspirators
are admissible under rule 801(d)(2)(E)). Rule 801(d)(2)(E) may even be involved in cases where a declarant has been acquitted on conspiracy counts.
United States v. Gil, 604 F.2d 546, 548-49 (7th Cir. 1979). See D. LoUISELL & C.
MUELLER, supra note 17, § 427, at 334-36. Although an acquittal may be "relevant and persuasive" to the admissibility of a coconspirator's statements, it is not
dispositive because the standard necessary to prove the existence of a conspiracy
for purposes of rule 801 (d)(2)(E) is a less stringent standard than proof beyond
a reasonable doubt. United States v. Gil, 604 F.2d at 549. Thus, "neither collateral estoppel nor res judicata automatically bars use of statements by a person
who has been acquitted of the crime of conspiracy." Id.
Coconspirator statements also may be admitted into evidence in civil proceedings. See James R. Snyder Co. v. Associated Gen. Contractors, 677 F.2d
1111, 1116-17 (6th Cir.) (coconspirator statements are properly admissible in
civil antitrust action), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1015 (1982); Paul F. Newton & Co. v.
Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d 1111, 1120-21 (5th Cir. 1980) (rule
801 (d)(2)(E) statements held admissible in civil securities fraud action). See also
FED. R. EVID. 1101 (b). Rule 1101 (b) provides: "These rules apply generally to
civil actions and proceedings, including admiralty and maritime cases, to criminal cases and proceedings, to contempt proceedings except those in which the
court may act summarily, and to proceedings and cases under Title 11 of the
United States Code." Id. For a discussion of the standard of proof necessary to
establish the foundational elements of rule 801(d)(2)(E) in a civil action, see
Case Comment, The Standard of Prooffor Admissions of Co-Conspirators' Out-of-Court
Statements in Civil Litigation, 12 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 531 (1982) (burden of proof

should be the same in criminal and civil proceedings). But see Bein, Substantive
Influences on the Use of Exceptions to the Hearsay Rule, 23 B.C.L. REV. 855, 892-911

(1982) (burden of proof under rule 801 (d)(2)(E) should not be the same in civil
antitrust litigation as it is in general criminal litigation).
38. Means v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 541 (White, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari), denying cert. to 729 F.2d 1462 (1984). For a further discussion of
the variances among the circuits, see infra notes 43-116 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 578 (5th Cir.) (jury to be
instructed that it could consider a coconspirator's statement "only if it first finds
that the conspiracy existed, and that the declarant and the defendant were mem-
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Under rule 104 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, however, all prelimi40
Accordingly, all the
nary questions are to be decided by ajudge alone.
41
from the jury.
determination
admissibility
the
circuits have withdrawn
As a result, the foundational requirements for establishing the existence
bers of it, and that the statement was made during the course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy"), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979). Several circuits,
however, relegated the determination of admissibility of coconspirators' statements to the judge alone. See United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 186, 203 (4th
Cir.) (relying on pre-Federal Rules of Evidence case law), cert. denied, 426 U.S.
922 (1976); United States v. Pisciotta, 469 F.2d 329, 332-33 (10th Cir. 1972) (to
have jury decide sufficiency of independant evidence would be valueless as it
would only confirm what jury already had determined); United States v. Bey, 437
F.2d 188, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1971) (once judge has made initial determination,jury
should not be given opportunity to second-guess him); United States v. Geaney,
417 F.2d 1116, 1119-20 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1028 (1970); Carbo
v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 736-37 (9th Cir. 1963) (it is impossible to expect
jury to comparmentalize evidence, separating that produced by hearsay declarations from other evidence), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
A reflection of the jury's role in determining the adequacy of foundational
evidence is found in thejury instructions used. For example, one model instruction reads in pertinent part:
Whenever it appears beyond a reasonable doubt from the evidence
in the case that a conspiracy existed, and that a defendant was one of
the members, then the statements thereafter knowingly made ..., by
any person likewise found to be a member, may be considered by the
jury as evidence in the case as to the defendant found to have been a
member, even though the statements . ..may have occurred in the
absence and without the knowledge of the defendant, provided such
statements ... were knowingly made and done during the continuance
of such conspiracy, and in furtherance of some object or purpose of the
conspiracy.
Otherwise, any admission or incriminatory statement made . . .
outside of court, by one person, may not be considered as evidence
against any person who was not present and did not hear the statement
made.
E. DEvrr & C. BLACKMAR, FEDERALJURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 27.06, at
13-14 (1977). For a discussion of how rule 801 (d) (2) (E) affects jury instructions,
see infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
40. FED. R. EvID. 104(a). Rule 104 is titled, "Preliminary Questions," and
provides in pertinent part:
(a) Questions of admissibility generally. Preliminary questions
concerning the qualification of a person to be a witness, the existence
of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined by
the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its
determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with
respect to privileges.
(b) Relevancy conditioned on fact. When the relevancy of evidence depends upon the-fulfillment of a condition of fact, the court
shall admit it upon, or subject to, the introduction of evidence sufficient
to support a finding of the fulfillment of the condition.
FED. R. EvID. 104. See also United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 22-23 (1st
Cir. 1977) (rule 104(a) requires that questions of admissibility of coconspirator
statements are to be decided by the judge alone).
41. For a list of cases from each circuit holding that the judge is the final
arbiter of questions of admissibility of coconspirators' statements, see infra note
55.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol30/iss6/9

10

1985]

Rizzolo: Testing the Reliability of Coconspirators' Statements Admitted un
COMMENT
1575

42
of a conspiracy for purposes of rule 801(d)(2)(E) have been relaxed.
In making the transition from a jury-oriented to a judge-oriented
decision-making process under rule 801(d)(2)(E), the courts of appeals
have had particular difficulty resolving three issues of admissibility. The
first issue involves the quantum of proof necessary to establish a conspiracy. 4 3 The second issue focuses on the effect of foundational evidence on the jury.4 4 The third issue hinges on the necessity of using
45
independent evidence to prove the conspiracy.

a.

The Standard of Proof

In a criminal conspiracy trial, the prosecution has the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt both the existence of a conspiracy
and the defendant's involvement in it. 4 6 For purposes of rule
801(d)(2)(E), however, a lesser standard of proof of conspiracy is applied. 4 7 In United States v. Nixon 48 the Supreme Court of the United
States identified the standard in a dictum as "substantial independent
evidence." '49 The majority of the federal courts, however, have not utilized the substantial independent evidence test primarily for two reasons: (1) the standard, as formulated in Nixon, provides little practical
guidance for application, 50 and (2) following Nixon, the adoption of rule
42. Recent Development, supra note 2 1, at 624. Changes in the law relating
to the admission of coconspirators' statements can be traced to the adoption of
rule 104. Id. A certain degree of change also may be traced to the fact that rule
801(d)(2)(E) does not expressly codify the common law requirement of independent evidence. Id.
43. For a further discussion of the circuits' views on the standard of proof
to be met in order to prove the foundational element of conspiracy, see infra
notes 46-71 and accompanying text.
44. For a discussion of the effect of evidence admitted as foundation for
rule 801(d)(2)(E), see infra notes 72-96 and accompanying text.
45. For a discussion of the requirement of independent evidence to prove
the existence of a conspiracy under rule 801(d)(2)(E), see infra notes 97-116 and
accompanying text.
46. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 341 (E. Cleary 2d ed. 1984).
47. See United States v. Gibbs, 739 F.2d 838, 843 & n.ll (3d Cir. 1984)

(standard of proof required to prove conspiracy under rule 801(d)(2)(E) has
been interpreted as either "fair preponderance of independent evidence" or
"substantial independent evidence"), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 779 (1985). At least
one commentator has argued, however, that the existence of a conspiracy should
be proved beyond a reasonable doubt before a coconspirator's statement is admitted. Kessler, supra note 27, at 79-80, 86-88.
48. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
49. Id. at 701 & n.14. In Nixon, the Court discussed the coconspirator hear-

say rule as a possible ground for admission of evidence contained in tape recordings subpoenaed from the President of the United States. Id. at 700-02.
50. See Comment, supra note 27, at 592. Substantial independent evidence
is an ambiguous standard. Id. It is not clear whether it is more lenient than
standards of "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" or "by a preponderance of the

evidence." Id. One circuit seems to have equated the substantial independent
evidence standard with the prima facie standard. See United States v. Dixon, 562
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104 shifted the burden of making foundational determinations from the
jury to the judge, thereby reducing the quantum of proof needed to es51
tablish a foundation.
Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, most federal circuits applied a prima facie standard to the foundational requirements of the coconspirator hearsay rule. 5 2 Under this standard, a party
offering a coconspirator's statement into evidence had to present prima
facie evidence of a conspiracy that, if unrebutted, would be adequate to
only
support, but not to compel, a finding of conspiracy. 53 Currently,
54
the Ninth Circuit adheres solely to the prima facie standard.
A majority of the federal circuits have found that the underlying
conspiracy must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. 5 5 The
F.2d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 1977) (finding it well settled in Ninth Circuit that substantial independent evidence is "enough to make a prima facie case"), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 927 (1978). Several circuits employ a substantial independent
evidence standard as the first prong of a two-pronged admissibility test. See
United States v. Bulman, 667 F.2d 1374, 1379 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
1010 (1982); United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1980);
United States v. Grassi, 616 F.2d 1295, 1300-01 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S.
956 (1980). For a further discussion of the two-pronged admissibility tests, see
infra notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1977)
(since admissibility must be determined by judge under rule 104(a), preponderance of evidence standard will be applied to preliminary determinations of conspiracy). For the text of rule 104, see supra note 40. For a further discussion of
the preponderance of the evidence standard, see infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
52. Comment, supra note 27, at 593. The prima facie standard was applied

by the judge before the evidence was submitted to the jury. Id. The jury was
then commonly instructed to redetermine the admissibility of such statements.
Id. See, e.g., Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718, 737 (9th Cir. 1963) (adopting
the prevailing prima facie standard), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964).
53. Garland & Snow, supra note 15, at 8. This is the same standard applied
by a judge in ruling on a motion for a directed verdict. C. MCCORMICK, supra
note 46, § 339.
54. United States v. Dixon, 562 F.2d 1138, 1141 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
435 U.S. 927 (1978). In Dixon, the Ninth Circuit adopted a "substantial independent evidence" test. Id. The court went on, however, to state that its test
would be satisfied by a prima facie showing of conspiracy. Id.
55. United States v. Gibbs, 739 F.2d 838, 843 (3rd Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 779 (1985); United States v. Andrews, 585 F.2d 961, 965-66 (10th Cir.

1978); United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128, 1134-35 (7th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Martorano, 557 F.2d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d
1294, 1297-99 & n.l (2d Cir. 1977); United States v.Jones, 542 F.2d 186, 20203 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976). Several other circuits also employ
the preponderance of the evidence standard to the second prong of a two-pronged admissibility test. See United States v. Bulman, 667 F.2d 1374, 1379 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 1010 (1982); United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198,
1219 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. Grassi, 616 F.2d 1295, 1301 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980).

For a further discussion of the standards of

proof under a two-pronged admissibility test, see infra notes 60-71 and accompanying text.
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preponderance of the evidence standard requires a judge to weigh evidence offered by both parties and to determine whether existence of a
conspiracy is more probable than not.5 6 This standard was adopted by
most circuits following the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
because its weighing process was better suited to the decision-making
authority delegated to judges under rule 104 than was the old prima
facie standard. 5 7 The preponderance of the evidence test is a more
stringent standard of proof and more difficult for a prosecutor to meet
than the prima facie test. 5 8 Unlike the prima facie standard, however,
the preponderance of the evidence test also places a burden upon the
defendant by requiring him to produce rebuttal evidence sufficient to
59
outweigh the prosecution's evidence.
The Fifth, 60 Tenth 6 ' and District of Columbia 6 2 Circuits currently
apply a two-step admissibility test to coconspirator statements. Under
the Fifth and Tenth Circuit formulations, a trial judge first must make a
threshold determination that the offering party has introduced "substantial evidence" of a conspiracy. 6 3 Thejudge must make this determination before the jury is permitted to hear the contested out-of-court
statement. 64 Substantial evidence under this formulation is interpreted
56. Garland & Snow, supra note 15, at 8.
57. Recent Development, supra note 21, at 628-29. The preponderance of
evidence standard has been described as better suited to rule 104's purposes
than the old prima facie standard for three reasons. First, under rule 104(a), a
judge's determination of a preliminary question of admissibility is conclusive,
therefore he should consider all the available evidence. Id. Second, rule 104
uses the word "determine," which imports a higher standard of proof than a
mere finding of a prima facie case. Id. Third, some circuits allow a judge to
consider hearsay and other inadmissible evidence in reaching his preliminary
finding, thereby necessitating the higher standard of proof. Id.
58. United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 23 (1st Cir. 1977) (changes
in rules of evidence require adoption of higher standard than prima facie evidence). United States v. Trotter, 529 F.2d 806, 812 n.8 (3d Cir. 1976) ("re-

quirement of prima facie proof is less stringent than that of preponderance of
the evidence").
59. Garland & Snow, supra note 15, at 8.
60. United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 580-83 (5th Cir.) (creating twopart test and rejecting prima facie standard), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979).
61. United States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d 1313, 1327-31 (10th Cir. 1979)
(adopting Fifth Circuit's two-part test, rejecting preponderance of evidence
test), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980).
62. United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1219-20 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(fashioning a two-part test).
63. United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 680-81 (5th Cir.) (standard of
substantial independent evidence is merely threshold question, made before
government has presented its case in full, and is more appropriate than standard
requiring preponderance of evidence), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979); United
States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d 1313, 1330 (10th Cir. 1979) (substantial independent evidence standard applied "rather than one requiring, at the initialstages of the
proceedings, a 'preponderance' of the evidence") (emphasis supplied by court),
cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980).

64. United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 581 (5th Cir.) (trial court's
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as a showing of a prima facie case-"at least enough evidence to take the
question to ajury. ' '65 If the statement is admitted, then upon appropriate motion at the conclusion of all the evidence, the court must make a
second determination that all the foundational elements of rule
801(d)(2)(E) have been established by a preponderance of the
66
evidence.
The District of Columbia Circuit has formulated a slightly different
two-step standard of proof.6 7 Under the first step of the test, a trial
judge must find that the existence of a conspiracy has been proved by
substantial independent evidence. 68 Although the District of Columbia
Circuit has not defined "substantial independent evidence," it has ruled
that the first step of its test may be fulfilled by presentation of less evidence than would be necessary "to take the question to the jury." 6 9 At
threshold determination usually is to be made "during the presentation of the
government's case in chief and before the evidence is heard by the jury"), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979).
65. United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 580-81 (5th Cir.) (citing United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 & n.14 (1974)), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917
(1979). See also United States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d 1313, 1330 n.l (10th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980). In Petersen, the Tenth Circuit explained
the substantial independent evidence test as requiring "such evidence as a reasonable mind would accept as adequate to support a conclusion" and "more
than a scintilla." 611 F.2d at 1330 n.1. The court also stated that evidence
would meet the test even if two inconsistent conclusions could be drawn from it.
Id. For a further discussion of the prima facie standard, see supra notes 52-54
and accompanying text.
66. United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 582-83 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 917 (1979). In James, the Fifth Circuit stated:
[O]n appropriate motion at the conclusion of all the evidence the court
must determine as a factual matter whether the prosecution has shown

by a preponderance of the evidence independent of the statement itself
(1) that a conspiracy existed, (2) that the coconspirator and the defendant against whom the coconspirator's statement is offered were members of the conspiracy, and (3) that the statement was made during the

course and in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Id. at 582. If the offering party fails to meet this test at the close of the evidence,
the statement must be withdrawn from evidence and may not be submitted to
the jury. Id. at 582-83. The judge then must decide whether the prejudice arising from the erroneous admission requires the declaration of a mistrial, or
whether it may be cured by a cautionary instruction to the jury. Id. See also
United States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d 1313, 1330-31 (10th Cir. 1979) (adopting
James test), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 905 (1980). For a further discussion of the pre-

ponderance of the evidence standard, see supra notes 55-59 and accompanying
text.
67. See United States v.Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (re-

jecting standards set by Fifth Circuit because they blur the "two discrete determinations" to be made by judge).
68. Id. Although the Jackson court adopted the same terminology as the
Fifth Circuit, this court expressly refused to interpret "substantial independent
evidence" in the same way the Fifth Circuit had. Id. at 1219-20.
69. Id. at 1219-29. The court explained that it believed the standard of

proof "would seem to be easier than that required to persuade the judge that a
reasonable juror could be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 1220.
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the close of all the evidence, the trial judge must make a second determination of admissibility, considering all the evidence 70 and determining
whether a reasonable juror could find the existence of a rule
71
801(d)(2)(E) conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt.
b.

Role of the Judge and Jury

Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, the judge
and jury often shared the responsibility of deciding questions of admissibility under the coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule. 72 Adoption of rule 104, however, has minimized the jury's role in deciding
these questions. 73 While rule 104(b) gives the jury the responsibility of
determining preliminary questions of relevance subject to conditions of
fact, 7 4 rule 104(a) delegates authority to the judge to decide all prelimiThus, the Jackson court's standard varies from the Fifth and Tenth Circuits' interpretation that "substantial independent evidence" means evidence which is sufficient to take the case to the jury. For a further discussion of the Fifth and
Tenth Circuits' interpretation, see supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
70. United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1219-20 (D.C. Cir. 1980). In
making this second determination, the court held that a trial judge may consider
all the evidence, including hearsay and potentially excludable coconspirators
statements, to determine the existence of a conspiracy. Id. Under the tests formulated by the Fifth and Tenth Circuits, the trial judge can consider only evidence that is independent of the disputed statements. See United States v.
James, 590 F.2d 575, 583 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979); United
States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d 1313, 1330-31 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S.
905 (1980). For a further discussion of the requirement that the trial judge rely
only upon independent evidence, see infra notes 97-116 and accompanying text.
71. United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 1219-20 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(quoting Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 331
U.S. 837 (1947)). The District Columbia Circuit enunciated the standard as
"whether upon the evidence, giving full play to the right of thejury to determine
credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences of fact, a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 1219.
The court also noted that this standard does not require as strong a determination as that made by a jury in determining whether a defendant is guilty of conspiracy. Id. at 1220.
72. See Note, supra note 27, at 128-31 (1982). Questions of admissibility
were determined through a two-part process. Id. at 128. Before conditionally
submitting coconspirator statements to a jury, a judge had to find that a prima
facie case of conspiracy had been established. Id. at 1228-29. Once an unconditional determination of conspiracy had been made by the judge, the jury had to
find the existence of a conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt before considering
the statements on the matter of guilt. See Recent Development, supra note 21, at
622-24. See also 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 27,
104(5). For a

further discussion of the delegation of questions of admissibility to the judge
and jury before adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, see supra note 39 and
accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 579 (5th Cir.) (rule 104

requires that preliminary questions under rule 801(d)(2)(E) be decided by
judge, not by jury), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979). For the text of rule 104, see
supra note 40.
74. FED. R. EvID. 104(b) advisory committee note. See also United States v.

James, 590 F.2d 575, 579 (5th Cir.) (jury decides preliminary questions of fact
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nary questions of competence of evidence. 7 5 Unfortunately, neither
rule 104 nor rule 801(d)(2)(E) provide any indication of whether proof
of conspiracy under rule 801(d)(2)(E) is to be treated as a question of
admissibility under rule 104(a) or a question of conditional relevance
under rule 104(b). 76 While the question logically could fall within either
of the two categories, 7 7 all of the federal circuits presently require that
the judge alone make preliminary factual determinations under rule
78
801 (d)(2)(E).
In considering the problems presented by ruling on the admissibility of coconspirator statements, the courts have been particularly sensitive to the danger of prejudice when the question is left to the jury. 79
upon whose existence the relevancy of particular evidence is conditioned), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979). Questions of "conditional relevancy" are generally
submitted to the jury in deference to its role as the trier of fact. FED. R. EVID.
104(b) advisory committee note. The judge makes a preliminary determination
of admissibility, i.e., whether the foundation evidence to be offered will be sufficient to support a finding of fulfillment of the "condition." If so, the disputed

item of evidence is admitted. After the submission of all foundation evidence
bearing on the existence of the fact upon which relevancy is conditioned, the
jury decides the issue, so long as the judge determines that the jury could reasonably conclude that the fact did not exist. Id. See also United States v. Enright,
579 F.2d 980, 984 (6th Cir. 1978) (foundational provisions under rule
801(d)(2)(E) could be couched in terms of conditional relevancy).
75. FED. R. EvID. 104(a). See United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980, 984
(6th Cir. 1978) (rule 104(a) requires questions of competence to be decided by
judge alone). According to the Sixth Circuit in Enright, the competence of a
coconspirator's statement is measured by asking "whether the conspiracy and
the defendant's participation in it render the hearsay declarations sufficiently
reliable to merit admission." Id.
76. United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 579 (5th Cir.) (neither rule 104
nor Advisory Committee's notes specifically address admissibility of coconspirator statements), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979); United States v. Enright,
579 F.2d 980, 984 (6th Cir. 1978) (it is unclear whether rule 104(a) or rule
104(b) covers the admissibility of coconspirator statements).
77. See United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980, 984 (6th Cir. 1978) (discussing opposing arguments as to whether rule 104(a) or rule 104(b) controls preliminary questions of proof of conspiracy).
78. United States v. Mastropieri, 685 F.2d 776, 787-89 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 945 (1982); United States v. Hartley, 678 F.2d 961, 973-74 (11 th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1170 (1983); United States v. Federico, 658 F.2d
1337, 1342 n.6 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Jackson, 627 F.2d 1198, 121718 (D.C. Cir. 1980); United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 579 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979); United States v. Andrews, 585 F.2d 961, 965 (10th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128, 1133 (7th Cir. 1978);
United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980, 984 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Bell, 573 F.2d 1040, 1043 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d
20, 22 (1st Cir. 1977); United States v. Trowery, 542 F.2d 623, 626-27 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1977); United States v. Jones, 542 F.2d 186,
203 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 922 (1976).
79. See, e.g., United States v.James, 590 F.2d 575, 579 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
442 U.S. 917 (1979). InJames, the court held that the admissibility of a coconspirator's statement is a question for the judge. Id. The court stated that coconspirator statements endanger "the integrity of the trial because the relevancy
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Even when the preliminary determination of conspiracy is delegated to
the judge, however, the possibility of jury prejudice still poses
problems.8 0 One such problem is related to the timing and order of
proof employed by a trial judge in ruling on the admissibility of coconspirator statements. A trial judge may conditionally admit a coconspirator's statements early in a trial subject to the stipulation that the
offering party later "connect them up," 8 1 or, the judge may withhold an
admissibility ruling until the foundational requirements of rule
801(d)(2)(E) are met. 8 2 Although jury confusion may result when the
prosecution is not allowed to present its evidence in the most logical
order, 8 3 an even greater danger of prejudice is presented when ajury is
84
If
allowed to consider evidence which is later held to be inadmissible.
inadmissible evidence has been conditionally admitted during trial, the
judge will have to weigh its prejudicial effect and determine whether a
limiting instruction to the jury or a declaration of mistrial would be the
appropriate remedy.8 5 In either case there is a danger that the jury's
and apparent probative value of the statements may be so highly prejudicial as
to color other evidence even in the mind of a conscientious juror, despite instructions to disregard the statements or to consider them conditionally." Id.
80. See generally IJ. WEINSTEIN & M. BEKGER, supra note 27, 104[5] at 10447 to -52, 104-57 to -58; Recent Development, supra note 21, at 622-24, 633-34.
81. United States v. Macklin, 573 F.2d 1046, 1049 n.3 (8th Cir.) (coconspirator's statement admitted under condition that it be later shown by sufficient
independent evidence that conspiracy existed), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 852 (1978);
United States v. Stanchich, 550 F.2d 1294, 1297-98 (2d Cir. 1977) (judge may
admit coconspirator statements "subject to connections").
82. United States v.James, 590 F.2d 575, 581-82 (5th Cir.) (whenever practicable, trial judge should require requisite showing of conspiracy and defendants' connection thereto before allowing coconspirator statements to be
introduced into evidence), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979).
83, United States v. Ricks, 639 F.2d 1305, 1309 (5th Cir. 1981) (pretrial
admissibility hearing will result in a less "clumsy" order or proof). But see
United States v. Legoto, 682 F.2d 180 (8th Cir.) (no prejudice where, instead of
ruling at close of all the evidence, and out ofjury's presence, admissibility ruling
was made at close of Government's evidence, and in front of jury), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1091 (1982). See generally 1J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 27,
104[105], at 104-52 (delay in making admissibility determination will inhibit the
government in laying out its case in the most desirable order).
84. See, e.g., United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 581-82 (5th Cir.) (when

coconspirator statement is conditionally admitted and never connected up, conspirator will have been prejudiced from jury's having heard inadmissible evidence), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979).
85. See 590 F.2d at 582. See also United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040, 1044
(8th Cir. 1978) (if offering party fails to meet burden of establishing conspiracy
by preponderance of the evidence once coconspirator's statement has been admitted, the court will declare mistrial upon appropriate motion, unless cautionary instruction will suffice to cure the prejudice); United States v. Geaney, 417
F.2d 1116, 1120 (2d Cir. 1969) (when offering party has not "connected up"
coconspirator's statement, judge shall "instruct the jury to disregard the hearsay
or, when this was so large a proportion of the proof as to render a cautionary
instruction of doubtful utility.. ., declare a mistrial if the defendant asks for it"),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1028 (1970).
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decision-making process will be adversely affected. In order to minimize
these dangers and facilitate the practical realities of a conspiracy trial,
timing and order of proof generally have been left to the discretion of
the trial judge,8 6 although several circuits have endorsed "preferred"
87
orders of proof.
A second problem relates to the nature of instructions to be given
when coconspirator statements are submitted to a jury for consideration. Prior to the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, when a
coconspirator's statement was submitted to a jury, the jury was instructed to determine the admissibility of the statement before considering it as probative evidence of guilt. 88 Since rule 104 now places the
admissibility determination in the hands of the judge, such an instruction is no longer necessary, and may confuse the jury. 89 Several circuits
have held that the jury should no longer be instructed regarding the
admissibility of a coconspirator's statement. 90 However, the giving of
such instructions seldom results in reversible error, since the instruc86. See, e.g., United States v. Kaatz, 705 F.2d 1237, 1244 (10th Cir. 1983)
(order of proof of elements of rule 801(d)(2)(E) is within discretion of trial
judge).
87. The Fifth Circuit, for example, has recommended that trial courts require a showing of conspiracy and a connection to the defendant before admitting coconspirator statements into evidence. United States v. James, 590 F.2d
575, 581-82 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979). The Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits have adopted the same preference. United States v. Alvarez, 696 F.2d
1307, 1310 (1th Cir.), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 907 (1983); United States v. Behrens, 689 F.2d 154, 158 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1088 (1982). The Eighth
Circuit will conditionally admit the out-of-court declaration of a coconspirator,
but it also requires an explicit finding by the trial judge, at the conclusion of all
the evidence, that a conspiracy has been proved by a preponderance of the evi-

dence. If the court determines that the offering party has not met this burden, it
will declare a mistrial unless cautionary jury instructions would be sufficient to
cure any prejudice. United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 1978).
But cf. United States v. Morton, 591 F.2d 483, 484-85 (8th Cir.) (failure of trial

court to make explicit finding constitutes harmless error when record shows preponderance of evidence and defense counsel failed to object), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 950 (1979). The First Circuit has adopted a minimally modified version of
the preference articulated by the Eighth Circuit in Bell. See United States v.
Ciampaglia, 628 F.2d 632, 638 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980).
88. See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 377 F.2d 412, 417 (5th Cir. 1967) (jury
may consider coconspirator's statement if it first finds independent evidence that
conspiracy existed and that statement was made both during course and in furtherance of the conspiracy), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 929 (1968). For an example of
a model jury instruction on the admissibility of coconspirators' statements, see
supra note 39.
89. United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980, 987 (6th Cir. 1978) (pointing
out that there is no longer a need for jury instructions that are "potentially confusing and internally inconsistent").
90. See, e.g., United States v. Santiago, 582 F.2d 1128, 1136 (7th Cir. 1978)
(there is no longer any need to give traditional jury instructions on admissibility); United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980, 987 (6th Cir. 1978) (disapproving
use of "confusing" jury instructions).
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tions constitute a windfall for the defendant. 9 1 To reduce the possibility
of confusion, the Eighth Circuit has recommended that the jury be cauthat the
tioned regarding the credibility of coconspirator statements, but
92
jury not be charged on the admissibility of such statements.
In cases in which ajury must decide whether a defendant is guilty of
the substantive crime of conspiracy, a potential problem is raised by the
interplay between rule 104(a) and the right to trial by jury guaranteed by
the sixth amendment. 93 The sixth amendment requires that all factual
questions relating to guilt or innocence be determined by a jury.9 4 Preliminary questions of admissibility traditionally have been excluded
from this requirement, however, as they do not relate directly to guilt or
innocence. 9 5 Although the courts have not addressed the issue, at least
one commentator has argued that the threshold question of conspiracy
under rule 801 (d)(2)(E) is sufficiently similar to a substantive finding of
criminal conspiracy to warrant its submission to the jury, in accordance
96
with the sixth amendment.
91. See, e.g., United States v. Nickerson, 606 F.2d 156, 158 (6th

Cir.), cert.

denied, 444 U.S. 994 (1979); United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20, 22-23 (1st
Cir. 1977) (although added layer of fact finding is unnecessary when jury is in-

structed to determine admissibility of coconspirator's statement, it seldom
prejudices defendant).
92. United States v. Bell, 573 F.2d 1040, 1044 (8th Cir. 1978). See also
United States v. Whitley, 670 F.2d 617, 620-21 (5th Cir. 1982) (judge should
first determine admissibility of statements, then jury should determine weight
and credibility).
93. The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an
impartial jury...." U.S. CONST. amend. VI. For a general discussion of the
potential violation of a criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to trial by
jury when preliminary questions are decided by a judge, see Garland & Snow,
supra note 15, at 12-14 (1972); Recent Development, supra note 21, at 627-28.
94. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1977) (accused is entitled to a
finding of proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to establish
the crime with which he is charged) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 353, 364
(1970)); United States v. Hayward, 420 F.2d 142, 144 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (it is implicit in sixth amendment that in criminal cases the "jury [must] decide all relevant issues of fact and . . . weigh the credibility of the witnesses").
95. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489-90 (1972) (normal rule is that "admissibility of evidence is a question for the court rather than the jury").
96. See Recent Development, supra note 21, at 627-28. This commentator

has argued that a trial judge's threshold determination that a conspiracy exists
for purposes of rule 801 (d)(2)(E) is analogous to the ultimate question of guilt
or innocence when conspiracy has been charged. Id. He concluded that it is

irrelevant that a lower standard of proof is used or that the question is merely
one of admissibility, because the judge's determination that a conspiracy existed
necessarily influences thejury. Id. But see United States v. Legato, 682 F.2d 180,

183 (8th Cir.) (in making determinations that conspiracy existed for purposes of
rule 801(d)(2)(E), judge's ruling in front of jury that defendants were "working
together," accompanied by cautionary instructions, did not prejudice defendants, even though jury had previously been instructed that it would determine
existence of conspiracy), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1091 (1982). See also Garland &
Snow, supra note 15, at 12-14 (sixth amendment does not preclude judge from
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Requirement of Independent Evidence

One of the most controversial questions generated by the adoption
of rule 801(d)(2)(E) is whether the foundational evidence required
before a statement is admissible under the rule can consist of alleged
coconspirators' statements. 97 Prior to the enactment of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, federal courts uniformly held that the admissibility of
coconspirators' statements could not be founded on the statements
themselves.9 " In Glasser v. United States, 99 the United States Supreme
Court ruled that coconspirators' statements only could be admitted into
evidence if they were supported by proof of conspiracy independent of
the statements themselves.' 0 0 The Court expressed fear that any other
interpretation would permit bootstrapping of hearsay evidence.' 0 '
Nothing in the Federal Rules of Evidence expressly states that coconspirators' statements cannot be used to establish the foundational
elements of rule 801(d)(2)(E). 10 2 Rule 104(a) states that preliminary
questions of admissibility generally are to be determined without regard
to the rules of evidence.' 0 3

In United States v. Martorano,10 4 the First

Circuit concluded that the Federal Rules of Evidence overruled Glasser
making preliminary factual determination of admissibility of coconspirator's
statement). For a discussion of the difference between conspiracy as a substantive crime and as an element of rule 801(d)(2)(E), see supra notes 34-37 and
accompanying text.
97. For a general discussion of the requirement that the admissibility of
coconspirators' statements be based on evidence independent of the statements
themselves, see D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 17, § 411; S. SALTZBURG
& K. REDDEN, supra note 17, at 503-09, 537-42; 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER,
supra note 27, Note, supra note 27, at 134-37; Recent Development, supra note

21, at 629-31.
98. Bergman, The Conspirators' Exception: Defining the Standardof the Independent Evidence Test Under the New FederalRules of Evidence, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 99, 100101 (1976).
99. 315 U.S. 60 (1942).
100. Id. at 74-75. The Glasser Court required a showing of "proof aliunde"
that a conspiracy existed before a coconspirator's statements could be admitted.
Id. The Court came to a similar conclusion in United States v. Nixon, where it
required proof of the conspiracy by "substantial independent evidence." 418 U.S.
683, 701 & n.14 (1974) (emphasis added).
101. 315 U.S. at 75. The Glasser Court stated that coconspirator statements
must be supported by independent proof of conspiracy, "[o]therwise, hearsay
would lift itself by its own bootstraps to the level of competent evidence." Id.
102. United States v.James, 590 F.2d 575, 581 (5th Cir.) (literal reading of
rule 801(d)(2)(E) and rule 104(a) discloses no requirement of independent
proof of conspiracy but the requirement may be implied from prior case law),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917 (1979). For the test of rule 801(d)(2)(E), see supra note

21. For the text of rule 104(a), see supra note 40.
103. FED. R. EVID. 104(a). When rule 104(a) was enacted, it was contemplated that the admissibility of an item of evidence may require consideration of
the item itself. Id. advisory committee note. Exercise of this view, however, is
limited to cases in which "practical necessity" requires its application. Id. For
example, in determining the admissibility of a declaration against interest, the

declaration itself must be considered, and in determining the competency of a
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and allowed the trial judge to base his preliminary finding of conspiracy
for purposes of rule 801(d)(2)(E) on the statements sought to be admitted. 10 5 The Martorano court reasoned that proof by independent evidence no longer was a precondition to the admission of a
coconspirator's statement because rule 104(a) permitted a trial judge to
consider hearsay and other inadmissible evidence in making preliminary
determinations. 106 Thus far, the Sixth Circuit is the only other circuit to
10 7
have adopted this position.
The remaining circuits have adhered to Glasser'sprohibition against
bootstrapping.' 0 8 Some courts have reached this conclusion without
addressing the impact of rule 104(a), 10 9 while others have followed the
witness to testify, particularly a small child, the witness' testimony must be considered. Id.
104. 557 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 922 (1978).
105. Id. at 11-12. In Martorano, the First Circuit stated:
We are aware that United States v. Glasser rejected the view that the
existence of a conspiracy could be proved by the very statement seeking
admission. The new rules, however, explicitly contemplate the consideration of such hearsay evidence in making preliminary findings of fact.

We believe the new rules must be taken as overruling Glasser to the
extent that it held that the statement seeking admission cannot be considered at all in making the determination whether a conspiracy exists.
Id. at 12 (citations omitted). The Martorano court went on, however, to caution
trial courts about the unreliability of bootstrapped evidence:
Glasser ... still stands as a warning to trial judges that such statements
should ordinarily be given little weight. Here, where there is significant

independent evidence of the existence of a conspiracy and where the
statement seeking admission simply corroborates inferences which can
be drawn from the independent evidence, we see no problem with the

consideration of that statement.
Id.
106. Id. at 11.

107. United States v. Vinson, 606 F.2d 149, 153 & n.8 (6th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1074 (1980). In Vinson, the Sixth Circuit recognized the split of
authority over the requirement of independent evidence of conspiracy, but went
on to conclude that rule 104(a) "modifies prior law to the contrary," allowing a
judge to consider the hearsay statements themselves to decide preliminary questions of admissibility. Id. In order to avoid prejudice, the Vinson court stated
that "the judge should refrain from advising the jury of his findings." Id. at 153.
108. See United States v. Terry, 702 F.2d 299, 320 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 931 (1983); United States v. Tunsil, 672 F.2d 879, 881-82 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 850 (1982); United States v. Cawley, 630 F.2d 1345, 1350 (9th
Cir. 1980); United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 930 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1144 (1982); United States v. Petersen, 611 F.2d
1313, 1330 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S. 833 (1979); United States v.
McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321, 1357 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 833 (1979);

United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 581 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 917
(1979); United States v. Macklin, 573 F.2d 1046, 1048 & n.2 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 852 (1978); United States v. Trowery, 542 F.2d 623, 627 (3d Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1977).
109. See, e.g., United States v. Trowery, 542 F.2d 623, 626-27 (3d Cir. 1976)
(citing Glasser for the proposition that independent evidence must be used to
prove conspiracy under rule 801(d)(2)(E)), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1104 (1977).
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lead of the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Macklin, 10 and expressly
rejected the First Circuit's holding in Martorano.'"1 In Macklin, the
Eighth Circuit concluded that bootstrapping of coconspirators' statements was not contemplated by the drafters of rule 104(a), and that independent evidence was still necessary to prove conspiracy under rule
801(d)(2)(E)."1 2 Still other circuits have handled the problem by attempting to harmonize rule 104(a) with Glasser." 3 These circuits have
reasoned that although rule 104(a) permits the judge to consider hearsay statements and other inadmissible evidence in making a preliminary
determination of conspiracy,' 14 the rule cannot be interpreted to permit
consideration of the very statements that are sought to be admitted."t 5
At least one commentator has asserted that these circuits have refused
to reject Glasser because its requirement of independent evidence provides a valuable safeguard to the reliability of coconspirators'
statements. 116
2.

During the Course of the Conspiracy

Once the existence of a conspiracy has been established, an offering
party must demonstrate that the statements offered were made "during
the course" of the conspiracy."17 This requirement of pendency has
been expressly incorporated into rule 801(d)(2)(E) as a codification of
the common law of evidence." 8 The pendency requirement has been
110. 573 F.2d 1046 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 852 (1978).
111. 573 F.2d at 1048 n.2. See also United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827,
835 (7th Cir. 1977).
112. 573 F.2d at 1048 n.2.
113. See United States v. James, 590 F.2d 575, 581 (5th Cir.) (if construed
to require evidence independent of the conspirator's statement whose admissibility is at issue, rule 104(a) comports with Glasser and Nixon), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 917 (1979). Accord United States v. Valencia, 609 F.2d 603, 635 n.24 (2d
Cir. 1979) (independent evidence used to make preliminary determination of
admissibility under rule 801 (d)(2)(E) does not include hearsay statements which
otherwise would be admissible only as coconspirator statements, but does include hearsay statements which would be admissible under other provisions of
the Federal Rules), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 940 (1980); United States v. Roe, 670
F.2d 956, 963 (11th Cir. 1982) (statements by conspirators which constitute
party admission under rule 801 (d) (2) (A) are admissible as independent evidence
to prove conspiracy under rule 801(d)(2)(E)), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 856 (1982).
114. See United States v.James, 590 F.2d 575, 581 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442
U.S. 917 (1979).
115. 590 F.2d at 581.
116. Recent Development, supra note 21, at 631 ("in the majority of cir-

cuits, then, the Glasser doctrine survives under Rule 104 because courts view it as
providing an important safeguard against unreliability").
117. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E). See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.

683, 701 (1974); Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 442-43 (1949);
United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936
(1983).
118. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee note. The Advisory
Committee noted that "[tlhe limitation upon the admissibility of statements of
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viewed as providing safeguards of reliability,' 19 because the declarant's
recollection and sincerity are enhanced by limiting application of rule
801(d)(2)(E) to statements that are made during the life of the conspiracy.' 2 0 In application, however, "the life of the conspiracy" has been
construed broadly. 121
A conspiracy generally has been interpreted to begin at the time an
illegal agreement is entered into, and to continue until the agreement is
completely executed or terminated in some other way. 122 It is irrelevant
of
that the statements were made prior to the cut-off date of the statute
23
limitations or at a time when the agreement was not yet illegal.1
While statements made after the termination of a conspiracy are not
admissible as coconspirator statements, 12 4 it often is difficult to determine when a conspiracy has ended.' 2 5 Generally, a conspiracy contincoconspirators to those made 'during the course... of the conspiracy' is in the
accepted pattern." Id. The requirement that only statements made "during the
course" of a conspiracy are admissible has long been the rule among federal
courts. See United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 460, 469-70 (1827).
119. Davenport, supra note 21, at 1385-87. The requirement of pendency
has been seen as an assurance of the declarant's sincerity because his interests
will be similar to those of the other conspirators while the goal of the conspiracy
is unfulfilled. Id. at 1386. The requirement also is viewed as improving the declarant's recollection, because the events occurring during the pendency will be
highlighted in his memory. Id. In practice, however, the pendency requirement
probably has little qualitative effect on the reliability of coconspirator statements, according to one commentator. Id. at 1386-87.
120. Id. at 1387-88.
121. 4J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 27, 801(d)(2)(E)[01]. One
common problem of conspiracy law is determining when a conspiracy began and
ended, since there is usually no formal agreement susceptible to proof. Id. at
801-247 to -249. See also Levie, supra note 2, at 1173-74. Levie has noted, "So
great is the hunger for evidence of conspiracy that some courts even admit declarations made prior to the illegal contract against all subsequent conspirators.
And the definition of when the conspiracy terminates is difficult and easily
manipulated to admit late admissions." Id. at 1173.
122. See J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 27, 801(d)(2)(E)[01], at
801-245 to -249.
123. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 231-32 (2d Cir. 1950) (there is
no logical reason to limit relevant evidence of a conspiracy to the period charged
or only to the period when the agreement had become a crime), arfd 341 U.S.
494 (1951).
124. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 615-20 (1953) (declarations of

a conspirator do not bind coconspirators if made after the conspiracy has
ended); United States v. Astorga-Torres, 682 F.2d 1331, 1336 (9th Cir.) (in-

struction that jury could consider a coconspirator's statement made prior to the
conspiracy was error, but held to be harmless), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1040 (1982).
125. See 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 17, § 427, at 338. Louisell
and Mueller have noted:
Conspiracy does not end like a football game, at a moment which can
be fixed with precision, and statements made during what can only be
viewed as the last possible minutes of pursuit of the main objective have
been held to be 'during' the conspiracy, including those made upon
apprehension by law enforcement officers but just before actual arrest.
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ues until its goals have been accomplished, abandoned, or terminated by
some other act. 126 Thus, it is the scope of the conspiratorial agreement
that is the crucial consideration, as the agreement determines the duration of the conspiracy.1 2 7 The life of a conspiracy does not extend into
the period of its concealment, 12 8 unless the concealment is an affirmative goal of the conspiracy 129 or an inevitable result of the crime committed.' 3 0 If the goal of a conspiracy includes distribution of proceeds,
the conspiracy does not terminate until the distribution is made.' 3 '
An individual conspirator may be held accountable under rule
801 (d) (2) (E) for statements made when he was not a member of the conspiracy.' 3 2 A conspirator joining a conspiracy after its commencement
usually is held accountable for all coconspirators' statements occurring
before his membership.13 3 In addition, statements made by coconspira126. Fishwick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 216 (1946) (a conspiracy continues as long as there is "continuity of action to produce the unlawful result,"
but the continuance of the result itself does not mean the conspiracy continues);
United States v. Rucker, 586 F.2d 899, 906 (2d Cir. 1978) ("Once a conspiracy is
shown to exist, which in its nature is not ended merely by lapse of time, it continues to exist until consummated, abandoned or otherwise terminated by some
affirmative act."). Although statements made after the termination of a conspiracy are not admissible into evidence under rule 801(d)(2)(E), acts which shed
light on the existence of a conspiracy are admissible even if they occur after the
conspiracy's termination. Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 219 (1974).
For a discussion of statements that may constitute verbal acts, see supra note 21.
For a general discussion of events that may terminate a conspiracy, see C.
McCORMICK, supra note 46, § 267.
127. Grunewald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391, 405 (1957).
128. Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 81 (1970) (it is settled federal law that
coconspirators' statements made during concealment phase of conspiracy are
not made "during the course of the conspiracy"); Grunewald v. United States,
353 U.S. 391, 406 (1957) (where no agreement to conceal conspiracy can be
shown or implied, conspiracy is deemed not to continue in existence during concealment period).
129. United States v. Mackey, 571 F.2d 376, 383 (7th Cir. 1978) (evidence
was sufficient for jury to find agreement to conceal from outset of conspiracy).
130. United States v. Diez, 515 F.2d 892, 897-98 (5th Cir. 1975) (because
crime of defrauding Internal Revenue Service by filing false returns ran inherent
risk of discovery through audit, concealment was inevitable goal of conspiracy),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1052 (1976).
131. United States v. Xheka, 704 F.2d 974, 985-86 (7th Cir.) (when conspiracy anticipates collection of proceeds from insurance company following fire,
conspiracy is not terminated until proceeds are collected), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
993 (1983); United States v. Knuckles, 581 F.2d 305, 313 (2d Cir.) ("[W]here a
general objective of the conspirators is money, the conspiracy does not end, of
necessity, before the spoils are divided among the miscreants."), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 986 (1978).
132. 4J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 27, $ 801(d)(2)(E)[01], at 801250 to -251; 4 D. LoUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 17, § 427, at 340-47.
133. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 393 (1948)
(once conspiracy is established, "the declarations and acts of the various members even though made or done prior to the adherence of some to the conspiracy, become admissible against all as declarations or acts of coconspirators in aid
of the conspiracy"). The rationale for this policy is that a new recruit arguably
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tors in furtherance of an original plan are admissible against an individual conspirator who has left the conspiracy, 134 unless that individual has
affirmatively withdrawn. 135 Statements made by a coconspirator after
he has left a conspiracy, however, are not admissible against the remain36
ing members of the conspiracy.1
3.

In Furtheranceof the Conspiracy

The final foundational requirement of rule 801(d)(2)(E) is that
statements sought to be introduced into evidence must have been made
in furtherance of the proven conspiracy. 13 7 Of the three foundational
requirements, this is the easiest to meet, i3 8 and the one affording the
least protection to alleged conspirators.' 3 9 The federal courts have read
the requirement liberally,14 0 interpreting it to encompass such evidence
can be thought to have joined the conspiracy with an implied adoption of prior
proceedings. 4J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 27, 801(d)(2)(E)[01], at
801-250 to -251.
134. United States v. Badolato, 710 F.2d 1509, 1512-13 (lth Cir. 1983)
(statements made by coconspirator in furtherance of conspiracy admissible
against conspirators who were in jail when statements were made).
135. United States v. Killian, 639 F.2d 206, 209 (5th Cir.) ("a member of a
conspiracy continues to be responsible for acts committed by coconspirators
even after the former's arrest unless he has withdrawn from the conspiracy"),
cert. denied, 451 U.S. 1021 (1981); United States v. Mardian, 546 F.2d 973, 978
n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (coconspirators' statements uttered after date of withdrawal
not admissible against withdrawing party). Withdrawal from a conspiracy will
not be recognized unless the former conspirator has "acted affirmatively to defeat or disavow the purpose of the conspiracy." Killian, 639 F.2d at 209.
136. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 490 (1963) (out-of-court
statement made after declarant's arrest may not be used against declarant's coconspirators). Statements made by conspirators after apprehension are deemed
to be particularly untrustworthy. Davenport, supra note 21, at 1386. Once a
conspirator is apprehended he is likely to seek immunity or a reduced sentence
by cooperating with the police, and the danger that he will inaccurately characterize the crime and misrepresent the activities of the participants in the conspiracy in order to better his position increases. Id. Even if post-conspiracy
statements are not admissible under rule 801(d)(2)(E), however, they may be
admissible as statements against penal interest under rule 804(b)(3). See generally
Note, Inculpatory DeclarationsAgainst Penal Interest and the CoconspiratorRule Under
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 56 IND. LJ. 151 (1980).
137. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2)(E). See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,

701 (1974); Anderson v. United States, 417 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1974).
138. 4 D. LouISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 17, § 427, at 248. These commentators assert that the "in furtherance" requirement has not proved to be a
significant obstacle to admissibility. Id.
139. Davenport, supra note 21, at 1387-88. "Many statements actually in
furtherance of an alleged conspiracy will be quite unreliable in whole or in part."
Id. at 1387. However, the "in furtherance" requirement will prevent certain
types of unreliable statements such as "bragging by the declarant to his friends"
and "squealing to the police out of fear of imminent apprehension." Id. For a
further discussion of unreliable statements excluded under the "in furtherance"
rule, see infra notes 148-52 and accompanying text.
140. See, e.g., United States v. James, 510 F.2d 546, 549 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855 (1975). In James, the Fifth Circuit stated that "in order to be
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as declarations of future intent, 14 ' statements unwittingly made to law
14 3
enforcement officials,' 4 2 and written records and nautical charts.
Although there have been efforts to eliminate the requirement,14 4 it has
been repeatedly endorsed by the Supreme Court 1 45 and expressly incor46
porated into rule 801(d)(2)(E). 1
To prove that a statement has been made in furtherance of a conspiracy it need be shown only that the statement was intended to adadmissible against one not present when the statement was made, it must have
been made 'in furtherance of the conspiracy.' Although this phrase has a talismanic ring to it, we must not apply the standard too strictly, lest we defeat the
purpose of the exception." Id. One commentator has criticized the "in furtherance" rule as a mere extension of the scope of employment doctrine of agency
law, slightly modified, and liberally applied by courts. Levie, supra note 2, at
1161, 1167-68. But see Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1949)
("in furtherance" requirement has been "scrupulously observed by federal
courts"). For a general discussion of the types of statements held to be in furtherance of a conspiracy, see 4 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 27,
801(d)(2)(E)[0 1], at 801-236 to -244; 4 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note
17, § 427, at 349-356.
141. United States v. Miller, 664 F.2d 94, 98-99 (5th Cir. 1981) (statement
by declarant that he later intended to sell false motor vehicle titles to three unnamed truckdrivers held to be made in furtherance of conspiracy), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 854 (1982). See also United States v. James, 510 F.2d 546, 549 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 855 (1975). The James court noted that statements
made during a mere conversation between coconspirators are not admissible
under the exception. 510 F.2d at 549. Puffing, boasts, and other conversation,
however, are admissible when used by the declarant to obtain the confidence of
one involved in the conspiracy. United States v. McGuire, 608 F.2d 1028, 1033
(5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 910 (1980).
142. United States v. Tombrello, 666 F.2d 485, 490-91 (11 th Cir.) (statements made by coconspirator to undercover FBI agent held to have been made
in furtherance of conspiracy), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 994 (1982).
143. United States v. Groce, 682 F.2d 1359, 1363-65 (11th Cir. 1982)
(marked nautical chart admitted as statement made in furtherance of conspiracy); United States v. Saimiento-Rozo, 676 F.2d 146, 149 (5th Cir. 1982) (ship's
log book and navigational chart admitted as statement made in furtherance of
conspiracy).

144. See MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE Rule 508(b) (1942) (requiring only that
statement be "relevant" to conspiracy and made during its pendency). See also
United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068, 1077 n.5 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1049 (1976). One commentator has suggested eliminating the requirement
from the coconspirator hearsay rule and replacing it with a ban on evidence that
is self-serving. Levie, supra note 2, at 1172.
145. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 (1974); Anderson v.
United States, 417 U.S. 211, 219 (1974); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 490 (1963); Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1949).
146. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee note. One commentator has characterized the Advisory Committee's retention of the "in furtherance" requirement as an attempt to "strike a balance between the great need for
conspirators' statements in combating undesireable criminal activity which is inherently secretive and difficult of proof, and the need to protect the accused
against idle chatter of criminal partners as well as inadvertently misreported and
deliberately fabricated evidence." 4J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 27,

801(d)(2)(E)[01], at 801-235.
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vance the objectives of the conspiracy. 14 7 This requirement provides no
affirmative assurance of reliability, but it affords limited protection from
certain types of inherently unreliable declarations.1 4 8 For example, narrative statements relating past events are not considered to have been
made in furtherance of a conspiracy.14 9 Additionally, confessions made
to law enforcement officials, 150 and statements which are conversational
or mere bragging do not satisfy the requirement. 15 1 These limitations
are not absolute, however, and courts have shown little aversion to finding the requirement satisfied by any statement that might be loosely in15 2
terpreted as advancing a goal of the conspiracy.
147. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 27, 801(d)(2)(E)[01], at 801233 to -234. "[A] damaging statement by a coconspirator is not [in furtherance
of a conspiracy] unless it tends to advance the objects of the conspiracy since it
would otherwise operate to frustrate rather than further the illegal design." Id.
See U.S. v. Hamilton, 689 F.2d 1262, 1269-70 (6th Cir. 1982) ("statements need
not actually further the conspiracy to be admissible," as long as they were "intended to promote conspiratorial objectives"), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1117 (1983).
148. For a discussion of the degree of reliability provided by the "in furtherance" requirement, see supra note 139.
149. United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971, 1027 (5th Cir. 1981) (casual,
retrospective statements and idle conversation between coconspirators are not
in furtherance of conspiracy), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982). Narrative statements are not considered to be made in furtherance of a conspiracy whether
made to outsiders or members of the conspiracy. See United States v.
Provenzano, 620 F.2d 985, 1000-01 (3d Cir.) (coconspirator's admissions to his
girlfriend and to one of his employees were not made in furtherance of conspiracy), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980). United States v. Moore, 522 F.2d 1068,
1077 (9th Cir. 1975) ("casual admission of culpability" to person that coconspirator "decided to trust" was not made in furtherance of conspiracy), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976).
150. United States v. Meacham, 626 F.2d 503, 510-11 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1980)
(statements made by coconspirator to police to assist in bringing other conspirators to justice were not made in furtherance of conspiracy).
151. See Battle v. Lubrizol Corp., 673 F.2d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 1982) (conspirator's boasts to his office staff were not statements made in furtherance of
conspiracy), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 1718 (1984); United States v. Traylor, 656
F.2d 1326, 1332-33 (9th Cir. 1981) (casual admissions of culpability and conversational statements of coconspirator to someone he decided to trust were not
made in furtherance of conspiracy).
152. See, e.g., United States v. Sears, 663 F.2d 896, 905 (9th Cir. 1981)
(since description of robbery to third persons was necessary to facilitate conspirators' escape, description was given in furtherance of conspiracy), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 1027 (1982); United States v. Pool, 660 F.2d 547, 562 (5th Cir. 1981)
(narrative statements to other conspirators are admissible under rule
801(d)(2)(E) because "when a conspirator provides information to his coconspirators necessary to keep them abreast of the conspiracy's current status, such
statements are properly admitted as coconspirator declarations"); United States
v. McGuire, 608 F.2d 1028, 1033 (5th Cir. 1979) (coconspirators' puffing,
boasts, and other conversation are admissible under rule 801(d)(2)(E) when
used by declarant to obtain confidence of one involved in conspiracy).
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THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND THE HEARSAY RULE

The sixth amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with
the witnesses against him .... ,,153 The right to confrontation has been
identified as the right of a criminal defendant to have his accusers
brought before him "face-to-face,"' 54 and has been recognized as one
of the fundamental requirements of a fair trial.155 Face-to-face confrontation sets a minimum standard of reliability for testimony introduced in
a criminal proceeding by assuring that a declarant testifies under oath, is
subject to cross-examination by opposing counsel, and is subject to observation by the jury.1 56 The right to face-to-face confrontation, however, may be overridden by other legitimate interests in the criminal
57
justice system. 1
153. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment's confrontation clause
evolved as a reaction to abuses under the English common law. See California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 156-57 (1970) (quoting 1J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE
CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 326 (1883)). In Green, the Supreme Court described
the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh as one of the historical antecedents of the confrontation clause:
A famous example is provided by the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh for
treason in 1603. A crucial element of the evidence against him consisted of the statements of one Cobham, implicating Raleigh in a plot to
seize the throne. Raleigh had since received a written retraction from
Cobham, and believed that Cobham would now testify in his favor. After a lengthy dispute over Raleigh's right to have Cobham called as a
witness, Cobham was not called, and Raleigh was convicted. At least
one author traces the Confrontation Clause to the common-law reaction against these abuses of the Raleigh trial.
Id. at 157 n.10 (citations omitted).
154. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980) ("the Confrontation
Clause reflects a preference for face-to-face confrontation at trial").
155. Pointer v. Texas, 380 u.S. 400, 405 (1965). The Pointer Court emphasized that "[t]here are few subjects, perhaps, upon which this Court and other
courts have been more nearly unanimous than in their expressions of belief that
the right of confrontation and cross-examination is an essential and fundamental
requirement for the kind of fair trial which is this country's constitutional goal."
Id.

156. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970). The requirement of a
sworn oath facilitates reliability by impressing the gravity of the testimony on a
witness, as well as giving the witness notice of the possibility of sanctions for
perjury. Id. Cross-examination is seen as the defendant's strongest assurance of
reliability, and is deemed the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." Id. (quoting 5J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367, at 32 (Chadbourn
rev. ed. 1974)). Allowing a jury to observe a witness as he testifies enhances the
jury's ability to weigh the witness' credibility. Id. See also Davenport, supra note
21, at 1278-81 (discussing protections provided by confrontation clause).
157. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973). In Chambers, the
Court observed:
Of course, the right to confront and to cross-examine is not absolute and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process. But its denial or significant
diminution calls into question the ultimate "integrity of the fact-finding
process" and requires that the competing interest be closely examined.
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When a hearsay statement is admitted into evidence, the declarant,
by definition, is not present at trial to be confronted by the accused. l5 8
Because there is a strong public policy in favor of using relevant evidence at trial to further effective law enforcement, the Supreme Court
has developed a body of case law that creates, for some hearsay statements, exceptions to the sixth amendment's requirement of face-to-face
confrontation.1 5 9 The cases have attempted to strike a balance between
absolute prohibition of hearsay when a declarant is not present at trial,
160
and total admissibility of all hearsay statements.
Mattox v. United States16 1 was the first Supreme Court decision to
interpret the criminal defendant's sixth amendment right of confrontation. In Mattox, the Court permitted a departure from the rule of faceto-face confrontation when testimony given by witnesses at an earlier
trial was introduced in a second trial held after the witnesses had
died.1 6 2 The Court identified two criteria to be met before hearsay evidence is admissible under the confrontation clause. 163 First, the necessities of the case must require admission; 164 and second, the hearsay
Id. (citing omitted).
158. See Garland & Snow, supra note 15, at 3-4, 14-15.
159. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 64 (1980). In Roberts, the Court
noted that "every jurisdiction has a strong interest in effective law enforcement,
and in the development and precise formulation of the rules of evidence applicable in criminal proceedings." Id. For a discussion of how the admission of
coconspirator statements facilitates the effective prosecution of criminal cases
involving conspiracy, see supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
160. For a general discussion of the evolution of the Supreme Court's treatment of the competing interests underlying the confrontation clause and the
exceptions to the hearsay rule, see Garland & Snow, supra note 15, at 14-22;

Marcus, supra note 27, at 308-14; Note, Inculpatory Statements Against Penal Interest
and the Confrontation Clause, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 159 (1983) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Inculpatory Statements], Note, State v. Roberts: Balancing the Right to Confront
with the Admission into Evidence of Preliminary Hearing Testimony, 10 CAP. U.L. REV.
365, 368-79 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Balancing Confrontation];Casenote,
The ConfrontationClause and the Catch-all Exception to the Hearsay Doctrine; Hopkinson
v. State, 17 LAND & WATER L. REV. 703, 705-710 (1982) [hereinafter cited as
Casenote, Catch-all Exception]; Casenote, Admission of Evidence of an UnavailableDeclarant's PreliminaryHearing Testimony Does Not Violate a Defendant's Right of Confrontation Guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment when the Testimony was Subject to Questioning
Equivalent to Significant Cross-Examination: Ohio v. Roberts, 59 U. DET. J. URB. L.

127, 130-35 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Casenote, PreliminaryHearing Testimony].
161. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
162. Id. at 240-44. In Mattox, two prosecution witnesses died between the

time of the defendant's original trial and the time of his retrial. Id. at 240. The

prosecution attempted to have the witnesses' testimony from the first trial read

at the second trial. Id. The defendant objected, claiming his sixth amendment

right to confrontation was being violated. Id.
163. Id. at 242-44. In establishing these criteria the Court drew an analogy
to the admission of dying declarations. Id. at 243-44. The Court noted that

technical adherence to the confrontation clause would mandate exclusion of dying declarations, but they are admitted because they are inherently trustworthy
and their admission would prevent a "manifest failure ofjustice." Id. at 243-44.
164. Id. at 244. In Mattox, the necessity of using hearsay evidence was
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evidence to be admitted must be shown to be competent.' 65 These two
criteria-necessity and competence-subsequently have become the es66
sence of the Supreme Court's confrontation clause jurisprudence.'
A group of cases decided by the Supreme Court during the 1960's
and early 1970's focused on the opportunity to cross-examine a witness
as the central test of competence under the confrontation clause.' 6 7 In
Pointerv. Texas,' 6 8 the Court held that admission of prior testimony of an
unavailable witness violated the confrontation clause when the defendant had no previous opportunity to cross-examine the witness.' 69 Later
cases extended this reasoning to strike down the admission of prior outof-court confessions of unavailable witnesses. 170
In California v.
demonstrated by showing that the declarants were unavailable to testify at trial
because they were dead. Id.
165. Id. at 244. In Mattox, the Court held that the evidence was competent
based on the previous cross-examination of the witnesses. Id.
166. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1980). In Roberts, the
Supreme Court's most recent recitation of this analysis, the Court stated that the
confrontation clause restricts admission of hearsay in two ways: (1) the rule of
necessity requiring face-to-face confrontation is abdicated only upon the offeror's demonstration of the unavailability of witnesses; and (2) the rule of competence now requires that hearsay be accompanied by "indicia of reliability,"
which would essentially render the statements as trustworthy as if the evidence
in question did comport with the general rule. Id.
167. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); Bruton v. United States,
391 U.S. 123 (1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415 (1965); Pointer v. Texas,
380 U.S. 400 (1965).
168. 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
169. Id. at 406-08. In Pointer,a witness was questioned by a prosecutor in a
preliminary hearing at which the defendant did not have an attorney. Id. at 401.
The witness was unavailable at the time of trial, because he had moved out of
state and did not intend to return. Id. The prosecution moved to enter his
preliminary hearing testimony into evidence. Id. The trial court granted the
motion over the defendant's objection, reasoning that the defendant had been
present at the preliminary hearing, and that the fact that no lawyer had been
appointed for him was not germane. Id. at 402. The defendant was convicted,
and the verdict was affirmed by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, but the
Supreme Court of the United States reversed the conviction on the ground that
the defendant had been denied his sixth amendment rights. Id. at 402, 407-08.
170. See, e.g., Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 420 (1965). In Douglas, a
document embodying a confession by Douglas' alleged partner in crime, who
had already been tried and convicted prior to Douglas' trial, was read into evidence after the declarant asserted his privilege against self-incrimination, and
despite the declarant's failure to testify and subsequent refusal to take the stand
at Douglas' trial. Id. at 416-17. Although marked as an exhibit, the document
itself was never offered into evidence. Id. at 417. The Supreme Court determined that admission of the statement violated Douglas' right to confrontation
because Douglas was afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.
Id. at 419-20.
See also Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 127-28 (1968). In Bruton, the
relevant facts were the same as those in Douglas, except that Bruton and his partner in crime were tried together on charges of armed postal robbery. Id. at 124.
At trial, the oral confession of Bruton's codefendant, Evans, was read into evidence and attested to by the postal inspector who interrogated Evans after he

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol30/iss6/9

30

Rizzolo: Testing the Reliability of Coconspirators' Statements Admitted un

1985]

COMMENT

1595

Green, 171 the Court held that admission of prior testimony of an unavailable witness did not violate the sixth amendment because the defendant
1 72
had been able to cross-examine the witness in a previous hearing.
The Green Court also stated that the confrontation clause would not have
been violated by the introduction of an out-of-court statement at trial if
the declarant was then available for cross-examination.17 3 In discussing
the competence of hearsay evidence generally, the Green Court noted
that the common-law hearsay rule and the sixth amendment's confrontation clause were designed to protect similar values, but that evidence
admissible under the hearsay rule or one of its exceptions is not neces1 74
sarily admissible under the confrontation clause.
In Barber v. Page,175 the Supreme Court focused upon the confrontation clause's requirement of necessity. 1 76 The Barber Court held that
was notified that the police had previously obtained an unconstitutional confession from Evans. Id. at 124 & n. 1. Evans invoked his fifth amendment rights and
never took the stand. Id. at 124. The judge instructed the jury that they could
not consider the confession with regard to Bruton, but Bruton was convicted
anyway. Id. at 124-25 & n.2. The Supreme Court determined that Bruton's
sixth amendment right of confrontation had been violated and that the violation
could not be cured with a cautionary instruction. Id.
171. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
172. Id. at 165-66. In Green, a witness testified at a preliminary hearing at

which Green and his attorney were present and also made a statement to a police officer inculpating Green. Id. at 151. At trial the witness' memory failed
unexpectedly. Id. at 151-52. The prosecutor then read portions of the witness'
preliminary hearing testimony to the witness and into the record as a prior inconsistent statement. Id. at 152. Later in the trial the police officer also testified
regarding the witness' previous out-of-court statement. Id. The Supreme Court
found the admission of the preliminary hearing testimony was not a violation of
the confrontation clause because Green had been afforded an opportunity to
cross-examine the witness. Id. at 165-66.
173. Id. at 164. Regarding the witness' previous out-of-court statement,
the Court concluded:
[T]he Confrontation Clause does not require excluding from evidence
the prior statements of a witness who concedes making the statements,
and who may be asked to defend or otherwise explain the inconsistency
between his prior and his present version of the events in question,
thus opening himself to full cross-examination at trial as to both
stories.
Id.
174. Id. at 155-56. The Green court stated:
While it may readily be conceded that hearsay rules and the Confrontation Clause are generally designed to protect similar values, it is
quite a different thing to suggest that the overlap is complete and that
the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less than a codification of
the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at
common law. Our decisions have never established such a congruence;
indeed, we have more than once found a violation of confrontation values even though the statements in issue were admitted under an arguably recognized hearsay exception.
Id.
175. 390 U.S. 719 (1968).

176. Id. at 724-26. In Barber, the petitioner was charged jointly with, but
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the prosecution must prove the necessity of using out-of-court statements at trial by demonstrating that the declarant is unavailable,' 7 7 and
that the prosecution has made a good faith effort to procure the declarant's attendance at trial.' 7 8 Most recently, the Supreme Court in United
tried separately from, a codefendant. Id. at 720. At the time of petitioner's trial,
the alleged partner in crime was incarcerated in another state. Id. At the petitioner's trial, the prosecution was allowed to introduce into evidence a transcript
of the partner's testimony at a preliminary hearing by claiming the partner was
unavailable for trial. Id. The petitioner was convicted. Id.
177. Id. at 725-26. In Barber, the Court refused to find that the declarant's
mere absence from the state of trial constituted unavailability under the confrontation clause. Id. at 724-25. However, the Supreme Court has identified several
situations in which a declarant will be considered "unavailable." See Ohio v.
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 75 (1980) (declarant was unavailable where she had disappeared and prosecution was unable to produce her at trial through reasonable
"good faith efforts"); Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204, 212 (1972) (declarant
permanently absent from country was unavailable); California v. Green, 399 U.S.
149, 167-68 (1970) (declarant who had memory lapse at trial was unavailable);
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895) (death of declarant constituted unavailability). Further criteria sufficient to constitute unavailability for
the purposes of the confrontation clause may be found in rule 804(a). The definition of unavailability in rule 804(a) provides:
"Unavailability as a witness" includes situations in which the
declarant(1) is exempted by ruling of the court on the ground of privilege from testifying concerning the subject matter of his statement;
or
(2) persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of his statement despite an order of the court to do so; or
(3) testifies to a lack of memory of the subject matter of his
statement; or
(4) is unable to be present or to testify at the hearing because
of death or then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity; or
(5) is absent from the hearing and the proponent of his statement has been unable to procure his attendance (or in the case of a
hearsay exception under subdivisions (b)(2), (3), or (4), his attendance or testimony) by process or other reasonable means.
A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if his exemption,
refusal, claim of lack of memory, inability, or absence is due to the
procurement or wrongdoing of the proponent of his statement for
the purpose of preventing the witness from attending or testifying.
FED.

R. EvID. 804(a).

178. 390 U.S. at 724-25. The Barber Court required the prosecution to
make a "good faith effort" to obtain a witness' attendance at trial before the
witness would be declared unavailable. However, the Court did not define
"good faith effort." Id. For a discussion of how the Supreme Court has subsequently interpreted the "good faith effort" requirement of unavailability, see infra notes 190 & 193-94 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court also has held that when a witness was not available to
testify at trial because of the Government's negligence, use of his prior statements violated a criminal defendant's sixth amendment right to confrontation.
Motes v. United States, 178 U.S. 458, 471 (1900). In Motes, the Court also observed that if the defendant can be shown to be responsible for a witness' absence from trial, the defendant "cannot complain if competent evidence is
admitted to supply the place of that which he has kept away." Id. at 471-72
(quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 158 (1878)).
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States v. Inadi' 7 9 narrowed the unavailability requirement of Barber to sit-

uations where the coconspirator statements sought to be introduced
consist of testimony given at some other proceeding. Distinguishing
such "former testimony" from the "out-of-court" coconspirator statements at issue in Inadi, the Court held that out-of-court coconspirator
statements are admissible over a confrontation clause objection without
regard to the declarant's unavailability. 180
In 1970, the Supreme Court broadened the focus of its confrontation clause competence analysis in its plurality opinion in Dutton v. Evans.18 1 Instead of requiring an opportunity to cross-examine the
179. 54 U.S.L.W. 4258, 4259-60 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1986) (finding that Barber

"specifically limited the unavailability exception to prior testimony").
180. Id. at 4260. Distinguishing Inadi from Barber, the Court stated:
There are good reasons why the unavailability rule, developed in
cases involving former testimony, is not applicable to co-conspirators'
out-of-court statements. Unlike some other exceptions to the hearsay
rules, or the exemption from the hearsay definition involved in this
case, former testimony often is only a weaker substitute for live testimony. It seldom has independent evidentiary significance of its own,
but is intended to replace live testimony. If the declarant is available
and the same information can be presented to the trier of fact in the
form of live testimony, with full cross-examination and the opportunity
to view the demeanor of the declarant, there is little justification for

relying on the weaker version. When two versions of the same evidence
are available, longstanding principles of the law of hearsay, applicable
as well to Confrontation Clause analysis, favor the better evidence.
Id. (citing Graham, The Right of Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 143 (1972)).

181. 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970) (plurality opinion). In Dutton, Evans was
tried and convicted of first-degree murder. Id. at 76. At Evans' trial, a postarrest statement of Evans' partner in crime was admitted under Georgia law as a
coconspirator statement. Id. at 76-78. The declarant did not testify at the trial,
but his statement was introduced through the testimony of a prison acquaintance. Id. at 77-78. The prisoner testified that he had asked the declarant how
he had made out in court following the declarant's arraignment on criminal
charges. Id. at 77. The prisoner than testified that the declarant responded, "If
it hadn't been for that dirty son-of-a-bitch Alex Evans, we wouldn't be in this
now." Id. Although the statement was made during the concealment period of
the conspiracy, it was admissible under Georgia law as having been made "during the course of the conspiracy." Id. at 78. For a discussion of the pendency
requirement of rule 801(d)(2)(E), see supra notes 117-136 and accompanying
text.
The opinion in Dutton was a plurality opinion. 400 U.S. at 74. Writing for
the plurality, Justice Stewart, was joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice White,
and Justice Blackmun. Justice Blackmun also filed a concurring opinion joined
by the Chief Justice. The fifth member of the majority, Justice Harlan, filed a
separate opinion, concurring in the result only. Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Black, Justice Douglas, and Justice Brennan.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Harlan argued that the confrontation
clause was not designed to weigh "the appropriateness of rules of evidence" and
that the task would be better performed as a function of due process. Id. at 9697 (Harlan,J., concurring). In rejecting the majority's interpretation of the sixth
amendment, Justice Harlan stated:
Regardless of the interpretation one puts on the words of the Con-
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declarant about his previous statements, the Dutton plurality analyzed
the inherent reliability of the hearsay statements as offered.' 8 2 The
Court held that an out-of-court statement made by a declarant who had
never been cross-examined, could be used at trial because it bore sufficient indicia of reliability.' 83 Noting that the purpose of the confrontation clause was to assure "accuracy of the truth-determining process in
criminal trials,"1 84 the Dutton plurality identified the following four possible indicia of reliability: (1) whether the statement was a mere assertion of past fact; 185 (2) whether the declarant had personal knowledge of
the facts he related; 18 6 (3) whether the statement may have been based
on faulty recollection; 18 7 and (4) whether the circumstances under
which the statement was made indicate that the declarant may have misfrontation Clause, the clause is simply not well designed for taking into
account the numerous factors that must be weighed in passing on the
appropriateness of rules of evidence. The failure of MR. JUSTICE STEWART'S opinion to explain the standard by which it tests Shaw's state-

ment, or how this standard can be squared with the seemingly absolute
command of the clause, bears witness to the fact that the clause is being
set a task for which it is not suited. The task is far more appropriately
performed under the aegis of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments'
commands that federal and state trials, respectively, must be conducted
in accordance with due process of law. It is by this standard that I
would test federal and state rules of evidence.
Id.
182. Id. at 89 (plurality opinion). For a discussion of the application and
expansion of Dutton's indicia of reliability by the federal courts, see infra notes
202-224 and accompanying text.

183. 400 U.S. at 89 (plurality opinion). The Court emphasized that "the
mission of the Confrontation Clause is to advance a practical concern for the
accuracy of the truth-determining process in criminal trials by assuring that 'the
trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement.'" Id. (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161 (1970)).
184. Id. at 88 (plurality opinion). The Dutton Court reasoned that because
the out-of-court statement admitted "contained no express assertion about past
fact," its reliability was subject to the scrutiny of the jury who had been put on
warning "against giving the statement undue weight." Id. It should be noted
that an assertion of past fact generally will violate the "in furtherance" requirement of rule 801(d)(2)(E). See supra note 149 and accompanying text.

185. 400 U.S. at 88-89 (plurality opinion). The Dutton Court found that the
declarant's personal knowledge of the identity and roles of the participants in
the crime being tried was established by two factors. Id. First, the declarant had
been linked to the crime by an unindicted, coconspirator who testified at trial.
Id. at 88 (plurality opinion). Second, the declarant already had been convicted
of the crime when Evans was brought to trial. Id. The Court also reasoned that
any cross-examination of the declarant would yield little to discredit the declarant's personal knowledge. Id. at 88-89 (plurality opinion).
186. Id. at 89 (plurality opinion). The Dutton Court simply asserted that

"the possibility that [the declarant's] statement was founded on faulty recollection is remote in the extreme." Id. The Court gave no explanation, however,
for reaching its conclusion. Id.
187. Id. In Dutton, the Court observed that the circumstances surrounding
the statement gave no indication that the declarant had a reason to lie. Id. In

addition, the Court found that the veracity of the statement was bolstered by the
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represented the truth.1
The Supreme Court reiterated an indicia of reliability standard of
evidentiary competence in Mancusi v. Stubbs. 18 9

The Mancusi Court

treated a previous opportunity to cross-examine a currently unavailable
declarant as an additional indicia of reliability sufficient to overcome the
sixth amendment's requirement of face-to-face confrontation.' 90 The
Court did, however, specifically predicate admissibility of the prior statements upon a showing of necessity.' 9 1
In Ohio v. Roberts, the Supreme Court construed the sixth amend92
ment as establishing a "preference" for face-to-face confrontation.'
The Roberts Court stated that the requirement of necessity is a reflection
of this preference, requiring in most cases that the prosecution either
produce the declarant or demonstrate that he is unavailable.' 9 3 The
Court refined the definition of unavailability, holding that the prosecution's duty to make a good-faith attempt to procure a declarant's attendance at trial is extended only to reasonable efforts and need not include
measures which are highly unlikely to lead to production of the
fact that the declarant made the statement spontaneously, and that it was against
his penal interest. Id.
188. 408 U.S. 204, 213 (1972). In Mancusi, defendant Stubbs was granted a
second trial after nine years of incarceration on a murder charge. Id. at 209.
During the nine years, the prosecution's key witness moved to Sweden and was
unable to be reached by subpoena. Id. Accordingly, the trial court allowed the
witness' testimony from the first trial to be read into evidence during the second
trial. Id. Stubbs was convicted a second time. Id.
189. Id. at 216. The court noted that since there was adequate opportunity
to cross-examine the witness at the first trial, and defense counsel did avail himself of that opportunity, there were sufficient indicia of reliability upon which the
trier of fact could evaluate the truth of the prior testimony. Id.
190. Id. at 209-13, 216. The Court determined that the witness' permanent

residence in Sweden precluded the state court in Tennessee from obtaining jurisdiction over him. Id. at 211-12. Therefore, the witness was unavailable for
purposes of the confrontation clause. Id. at 212. For a discussion of other situations in which a witness is deemed "unavailable," see supra note 177.

191. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). Roberts was charged with check forgery and possession of stolen credit cards. Id. at 58. At a preliminary hearing, Roberts called
a witness to corroborate his defense. Id. at 58. The witness became hostile and
refused to cooperate with Roberts' attorney. Id. Defense counsel, however, did
not have the witness declared hostile nor did he request permission to crossexamine her. Id. The defense counsel asked 17 leading questions in his direct
examination. Id. at 70. The witness proceeded to testify against Roberts. Id. at
58. At Roberts' trial, the prosecution introduced the witness' preliminary hearing testimony, claiming that the witness was unavailable. Id. at 59. At the time
of trial, the prosecutor had been unable to locate the witness although several
attempts had been made. Id. For a detailed analysis of Roberts, see Note, Balancing Confrontation, supra note 160; Casenote, Preliminary Hearing Testimony, supra

note 160.
192. 448 U.S. at 63, 65.
193. Id. at 65. Unavailability must be demonstrated even in cases where
prior cross-examination has occurred. Id. For a discussion of the Supreme
Court's earlier interpretation of the unavailability requirement, see supra notes
177 & 190.
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declarant. 1
The most significant aspect of the Roberts decision has become its
refinement of the standard of reliability to be applied under the confrontation clause. 195 The Roberts Court noted that once a witness is found to
be "unavailable,"' 96 his out-of-court statements are admissible at trial
only if they are accompanied by indicia of reliability sufficient to "afford
the trier of fact a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior
statements."' 9 7 The Court then held that a previous opportunity to
cross-examine an unavailable witness, which was exercised by counsel,
was a sufficient indicia of reliability in and of itself.' 9 8 The Court also
noted that if a hearsay statement fits within "a firmly rooted hearsay exception,"' 19 9 the statement can be inferred to be sufficiently reliable to
200
meet the requirements of the confrontation clause.
194. 448 U.S. at 75-76. In Roberts, the prosecution had been unable to locate the'witness, who was traveling outside the state. Id. at 75. The prosecutor
issued five subpoenas to the witness at her parents home but she received none
of them. Id. The prosecutor also questioned the witness' parents who also were
unable to locate the witness. Id. Although the prosecutor could have taken further action, the Court did not find this was necessary to meet his obligation to
make a good-faith attempt to secure the witness' attendance at trial. Id. at 76.
195. For a discussion of the reliability analysis set forth in Roberts, see Casenote, Preliminary Hearing Testing, supra note 160, at 135-42.
196. 448 U.S. at 65. The Roberts Court noted, however, that unavailability
need not always be demonstrated before a hearsay statement may be admitted.
Id. at 65 n.7 (citing Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970)). For a further
discussion of Dutton, see supra notes 179-87 and accompanying text. See also
United States v. Inadi, 54 U.S.L.W. 4258 (U.S. Mar. 10, 1986) (unavailability
irrelevant where coconspirator statement sought to be introduced was made
"out-of-court" rather than in former testimony). For a further discussion of Inadi, see supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
197. 448 U.S. at 65-66 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 161

(1970)). The Roberts Court noted that the purpose of the confrontation clause is
to "augment accuracy in the factfinding process." Id. at 65.
198. Id. at 73. Although Roberts' counsel had not expressly been given the
right to cross-examine the witness in the preliminary hearing, the Court found
that the examination was a cross-examination in form. Id. at 70-71 & n. 11. The

Court also refused to search for particular indicia of reliability, reasoning that

the earlier cross-examination of the witness made the statements sufficiently reliable in and of itself. Id. at 72-73. Accord California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149
(1970); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
199. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
200. Id. In analyzing the hearsay rule and its exceptions, the Roberts Court
noted that the exceptions are neither uniformly recognized nor uniformly enforced among the jurisdictions, and compared them to "an old-fashioned crazy
quilt made of patches cut from a group of paintings by cubists, futurists and
surrealists." Id. at 62 (quoting Morgan & Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward
at Evidence, 50 HARv. L. REV. 909, 921 (1937)). The Court then stated:
The Court has applied this "indicia of reliability" requirement
principally by concluding that certain hearsay exceptions rest upon

such solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within
them comports with the "substance of the constitutional protection."
This reflects the truism that "hearsay rules and the Confrontation
Clause are generally designed to protect similar values," and "stem
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THE APPLICATION OF THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE'S REQUIREMENT

OF RELIABILITY TO RULE 801(d)(2)(E)

The Supreme Court of the United States has never subjected the
reliability of coconspirator statements admissible under rule
801(d)(2)(E) to confrontation clause scrutiny. 20 1 In Dutton v. Evans,
however, the Court did apply the confrontation clause to a statement
admitted under Georgia's coconspirator exception to the hearsay
rule, 20 2 and determined that case-by-case analysis was necessary to de20 3
termine if statements so admitted bore sufficient indicia of reliability.
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) has been more narrowly construed than the coconspirator exception reviewed in Dutton,20 4 and the federal courts of apfrom the same roots." It also responds to the need for certainty in the
workaday world of conducting criminal trials.
In sum, when a hearsay declarant is not present for cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause normally requires a showing that
he is unavailable. Even then, his statement is admissible only if it bears
adequate "indicia of reliability." Reliability can be inferred without
more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception. In other cases, the evidence must be excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.
Id. at 66 (citations and footnotes omitted). For a further discussion of the hearsay exceptions which are considered "firmly rooted," see infra notes 222-232
and accompanying text. For a general discussion of the hearsay exceptions and
non-hearsay under the Federal Rules of Evidence, see supra notes 17-21 and
accompanying text.
201. See United States v. Inadi, 54 U.S.L.W. 4258, 4259 & n.3 (U.S. Mar. 10,
1986) (holding unavailability need not be demonstrated before "out-of-court"
coconspirator statements are admissible, but reserving judgment as to whether
such statements must be shown to be reliable). Sanson v. United States, 104 S.
Ct. 3559, 3560 (1984) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (advocating review of confusing question of whether statements that satisfy rule
801(d)(2)(E) necessarily satisfy the requirements of the confrontation clause),
denying cert. to 727 F.2d 1113 (7th Cir. 1984).
202. 400 U.S. at 81-82, 87-90. The Georgia statute provided: "After the
fact of conspiracy shall be proved, the declarations by any one of the conspirators during the pendency of the criminal project shall be admissible against all."
Id. at 78 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 38-306 (1954)).
203. 400 U.S. at 87-89. The Dutton Court observed that the Georgia coconspirator exception was "long established under state statutory law," and that it
was susceptible to interpretation both in compliance with and in violation of the
confrontation clause. Id. at 87-88. The Court looked to the presence of indicia
of reliability to determine whether the application of the rule under the circumstances of the case was consistent with the confrontation clause. Id. at 88-89.
For a further discussion of the indicia of reliability relied upon by the Dutton
Court, see supra notes 181-87 and accompanying text.
204. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ordonez, 737 F.2d 793, 812-14 (9th Cir.
1984) (Norris, J., concurring in part). In his partial concurrence to Ordonez,
Judge Norris pointed out that the Georgia coconspirator hearsay rule scrutinized by the Dutton court was less stringent than rule 801(d)(2)(E) because the
Georgia rule permitted admission of statements made during the concealment
period of the conspiracy. Id. at 812-13. For a discussion of the Georgia coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule, see supra note 179. For a discussion of
the admissibility of coconspirators' statements during the concealment period of
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peals have split over the issue of whether statements admitted under
rule 801(d)(2)(E) must also be tested for reliability on a case-by-case
basis, or whether such statements are per se reliable as "firmly rooted
hearsay exceptions." 20 5

The Second,20 6 Third,20 7 Eighth, 20 8 Ninth, 20 9 and Tenth 2 10 Circuits have held that the confrontation clause requires every coconspirator statement to be supported by independent indicia of reliability
before it may be admitted at trial. These circuits have rejected the notion that the coconspirator hearsay rule codified in rule 801(d) (2) (E) is a
conspiracy under rule 801(d)(2)(E), see supra notes 128-30 and accompanying
text.
205. Sanson v. United States, 104 S. Ct. 3559 (1984) (WhiteJ., dissenting
from denial of certiorari), denying cert. to 727 F.2d 1113 (7th Cir. 1984). In his

dissent, Justice White noted that the federal circuits are divided on the question
of whether rule 801(d)(2)(E) is a "firmly rooted hearsay exception," and advocated a grant of certiorari to resolve this issue. Id. See also Means v. United
States, 105 S. Ct. 541, (1984) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari)
(noting that the circuits remain split over the question of "whether a coconspirator's statement that is admissible under the Federal Rules automatically satisfies the requirements of the Confrontation Clause"), denying cert. to 729 F.2d
1462 (6th Cir. 1984).

206. United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1978) (there must be
case-by-case examination of coconspirator statements to determine if their admission has abridged confrontation clause), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1979).
207. United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 256 (3d Cir.) ("It must be separately ascertained whether coconspirator statements sought to be admitted are

attended by adequate assurances of reliability."), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936
(1983).
208. United States v. Massa, 740 F.2d 629, 639 (8th Cir. 1984) (confronta-

tion clause inquiry was not satisfied by meeting prerequisites of rule
801(d)(2)(E) alone; other factors relevant to reliability also were considered, cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 2357 (1985).
209. United States v. Ordonez, 737 F2d 793, 803-04 (9th Cir. 1984) (trial

court must undertake reliability inquiry considering factors set forth in Dutton
prior to admission of coconspirator statements); United States v. Perez, 658 F.2d
654, 660-61 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Admission under the coconspirator exception
does not automatically guarantee compliance with the Confrontation Clause.").
210. United States v. Roberts, 583 F.2d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1080 (1979). In United States v. Roberts, the Tenth Circuit stated:
Simply pigeon-holing evidence into a recognized exception is insufficient to show compliance with the confrontation clause. In the case of a
coconspirator's extrajudicial declarations, Sixth Amendment compliance is tested on a case by case basis by examining all the circumstances
to determine whether "the trier of fact [has] a satisfactory basis for evaluating the truth of the prior statement."
583 F.2d at 117 (citations omitted). It should be noted that United States v. Roberts was decided before the Supreme Court recognized the reliability of "firmly
rooted hearsay exceptions" in Ohio v. Roberts. Subsequent to the Supreme
Court's decision, however, the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed its adherence to the
case-by-case reliability analysis. See United States v. McManaman, 606 F.2d 919,

926-27 (10th Cir. 1979) (following per se test, but supporting its determination
of admissibility with discussion of indicia of reliability); United States v. McManaman, 653 F.2d 458, 461 (10th Cir. 1981) (applying indicia of reliability test to
rely on decision in earlier McManaman decision).
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"a firmly rooted hearsay exception," '21 I reasoning that coconspirators'
statements are admitted because of necessity and not because they are
inherently trustworthy. 21 2 Accordingly, the reliability of statements offered under rule 801(d)(2)(E) is tested on a case-by-case basis, 2 13 and
211. See, e.g., United States v. Massa, 740 F.2d 629, 639 (8th Cir. 1984)
(coconspirator statements are not "firmly rooted hearsay exceptions[s]" from
which reliability may be inferred), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2357 (1985); United
States v. Ordonez, 737 F.2d 793, 803 (9th Cir. 1984) (rejecting assertion that
coconspirator statements are "per se admissible without violating the confrontation clause"); United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 254-57 (3d Cir.) (coconspirator statements are not firmly rooted hearsay exceptions under Federal
Rules of Evidence), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936 (1983).
212. See, e.g., United States v. Massa, 740 F.2d 629, 639 (8th Cir. 1984)
("coconspirator statements may be more in need of scrutiny under confrontation clause precisely because ... they are not admissible because of their inherent reliability"), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct. 2357 (1985); United States v. Perez, 658
F.2d 654, 600 n.5 (9th Cir. 1981) (coconspirator statements do not bear same
degree of reliability as hearsay statements admitted as dying declarations or as
prior, cross-examined testimony). The Third Circuit has most fully developed
the argument that rule 801(d)(2)(E) is not a "firmly rooted hearsay exception."
See United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 255-56 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.
936 (1983). The Ammar court reasoned:
[T]he rationale for admitting evidence under the rules covering hearsay
exceptions is different from that used to admit coconspirator statements. Evidence falling within the hearsay exceptions is admissible because of its special trustworthiness. Admissions, on the other hand, are
not admitted because of confidence in their inherent reliability. They
are instead admitted because a party will not be heard to object that
she/he is unworthy of credence. As explained by the Advisory Committee, "Admissions by a party-opponent are excluded from the category of hearsay on the theory that their admissibility in evidence is the
result of the adversary system rather than satisfaction of the conditions
of the hearsay rule.... No guarantee of trustworthiness is required in
the case of an admission." ...
Rule 801(d)(2) treats coconspirator statements as a category of
party admissions. It does so because of the legal fiction that each conspirator is an agent of the other and that the statements of one can
therefore be attributable to all. In effect, the Rules have adopted the
agency rationale, although the framers recognized that this theory is
"at best a fiction."
714 F.2d at 255-56 (citations omitted). For a discussion of the agency rationale
of conspiracy, see supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text. The Ammar Court also
reasoned that rule 801(d)(2)(E) cannot be a "firmly rooted hearsay exception"
because technically it is not one of the "exceptions" to the hearsay rule under
the Federal Rules of Evidence, which are embodied in rules 803 and 804. 714
F.2d at 255. Instead, rule 801(d)(2)(E) defines a category of statements that are
not considered hearsay. Id. The Eighth Circuit, however, has rejected this argument, reasoning: "While it is true that [Ohio v. Roberts] specifically addressed
hearsay exceptions, the same interest in face-to-face confrontation is at stake when

out-of-court statements of coconspirators are admitted as nonhearsay under the
agency theory of Fed. R. Evid. 801(d)(2)(E)." United States v. Massa, 740 F.2d
629, 639 (8th Cir. 1984) (emphasis supplied by court), cert. denied, 105 S.Ct.
2357 (1985).
213. See, e.g., United States v. Wright, 588 F.2d 31, 37-38 (2d Cir. 1978)
(requiring trial courts to weigh reliability of coconspirators' statements on a
case-by-case basis), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 917 (1979).
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must be established through a confrontation clause analysis independent of the foundational analysis required by the rule itself.2 14 To test
the reliability of coconspirators' statements, these courts have relied pri2 15
marily on the four indicia of trustworthiness identified in Dutton,
2 16
although the Tenth Circuit has expanded and modified the inquiry.
The First,2 1 7 Fourth,2 18 Fifth, 2 19 Sixth 220 and Seventh 22 1 Circuits
214. United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 256 (3d Cir.) (reliability under
confrontation clause must be distinguished from admissibility inquiry under rule
801(d)(2)(E)), cert. denied 464 U.S. 936 (1983).
215. See, e.g., United States v. Ordonez, 737 F.2d 793, 802-03 (9th Cir.
1984) (applying Dutton standards for determining reliability). Some courts have
held that all four indicia of reliability need not be present. See, e.g., United States
v. Perez, 658 F.2d 654, 661 (9th Cir. 1981) (under certain circumstances, statement may be admitted even if it fails to pass scrutiny under each prong of Dutton
test). For a further discussion of the Dutton standards, see supra notes 179-80
and accompanying text.
216. United States v. Roberts, 583 F.2d 1173, 1176 (10th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1080 (1979). The Tenth Circuit expanded its list of indicia of
reliability to include the following:
(1) what opportunity the jury had to evaluate the credibility of the declarant, (2) whether the statements were crucial to the government's
case or devastating to the defense, (3) the declarant's knowledge of the
identities and roles of the other coconspirators, (4) whether the extrajudicial statements might be founded on faulty recollection, (5) whether
the circumstances under which the statements were made provide reason to believe the declarant misrepresented defendant's involvement in
the crime, (6) whether the statements were ambiguous, (7) what limitingjury instructions, if any, were given, (8) whether prosecutorial misconduct was present, etc.
583 F.2d at 1176.
217. Ottomano v. United States, 468 F.2d 269, 273 (1st Cir. 1972) (defendant's sixth amendment right to confrontation was not violated by introduction of
coconspirators' statements into evidence because statements were "fully admissible under a recognized exception to the hearsay rule"), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
1128 (1973). See also United States v. Bautista, 731 F.2d 97, 100-01 (1st Cir.
1984) (determining that rule 801(d)(2)(E) does not violate confrontation clause,
but also finding that statements admitted were presumptively reliable as declarations against penal interest).
218. United States v. Lurz, 666 F.2d 69, 80-81 (4th Cir. 1981) (statements
permitted under rule 801 (d)(2)(E) as exceptions to hearsay rule and admitted as
such do not violate confrontation clause), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 843 (1982).
219. United States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 349-50 (5th Cir. 1981) (rule
801(d)(2)(E) is firmly rooted hearsay exception and therefore it will be inferred
that statements admitted under this exception meet confrontation clause's requirement of reliability), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 965 (1983).
220. United States v. Marks, 585 F.2d 164, 170 n.5 (6th Cir. 1978) ("Where
evidence comes within Rule 801(d)(2)(E), the confrontation right under the
Sixth Amendment is not violated, even if the statement clearly implicates the
defendant and the declarant is unavailable for cross-examination."); United
States v. McManus, 560 F.2d 747, 750 (6th Cir. 1977) (statements that "fell
squarely within the confines of the narrow coconspirator exception to the [hearsay] rule" did not violate criminal defendant's right to confrontation under sixth
amendment), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1047 (1978).
221. United States v. Chiavola, 744 F.2d 1271, 1276 (7th Cir. 1984) (refusing to depart from rule that "confrontation clause presents no bar to the use of
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have held that statements conforming to the admissibility requirements
of rule 801(d)(2)(E) are per se admissible under the confrontation
clause. Most courts that have adopted the per se rule simply have reasoned that rule 801(d)(2)(E) falls within the "firmly rooted" category of
hearsay exceptions. 22 2 The courts that have analyzed the bases for the
per se rule have argued that its adoption is warranted because it eliminates the need for case-by-case analysis,2 2 3 and because rule
22 4
801 (d)(2)(E) provides adequate assurances of reliability.
V.

ANALYSIS:

DOES RULE 801(d)(2)(E) PROVIDE ADEQUATE
ASSURANCES OF RELIABILITY?

It is submitted that per se admission of coconspirator statements
that comply with rule 801 (d)(2)(E), upon a mere showing of necessity,
circumvents the confrontation clause's requirement of adequate assurances of reliability. If the category of "firmly rooted hearsay exceptions" discussed in Ohio v. Roberts is interpreted to include all well
recognized hearsay exceptions, then all statements admissible under rule
801(d)(2)(E) may be considered per se reliable. However, the Roberts
Court, quoting language from Mattox v. United States, defined "firmly
extra-judicial coconspirator statements admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(E)");
United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827, 836 n.3 (7th Cir. 1977) (adopting per se
rule of reliability under confrontation clause for statements properly admissible
under rule 801(d)(2)(E)).
222. See, e.g., United States v. McManus, 560 F.2d 747, 750 (6th Cir. 1977)
(admission of coconspirator statements did not violate confrontation clause because it was within various confines of an exception to hearsay rule) (citing
Campbell v. United States, 415 F.2d 356, 357 (6th Cir. 1969)), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1047 (1978); United States v. Ottomano, 468 F.2d 269, 273 (1st Cir. 1972)
(admission of coconspirator's statement did not violate confrontation clause because it was "fully admissible under a recognized exception to the hearsay
rule"), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1128 (1973). It has been argued that the reference
to "firmly rooted hearsay exceptions" in Ohio v. Roberts applies to any "wellestablished" hearsay exception. United States v. Ordonez, 737 F.2d 793, 812-13
(9th Cir. 1984) (Norris, J., dissenting). Judge Norris also has argued that since
the Supreme Court drafted the Federal Rules of Evidence, it may be inferred
that rule 801 (d)(2)(E) complies with the confrontation clause. Id. at 814 (Norris,
J., dissenting).
223. See, e.g., United States v. Papia, 560 F.2d 827, 836 n.3 (7th Cir. 1977)
(declining to make confrontation clause reliability analysis "on a statement-bystatement and case-by-case basis").
224. Id. In the view of the Papia court, the "Confrontation Clause presents
no bar to the use of extrajudicial statements of a co-conspirator admissible
under Rule 801(d)(2)(E)" because "the community of interests of the coconspirator evidences likelihood of reliability." Id. (citing United States v. Isaacs,
493 F.2d 1124, 1161 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974)). See also United
States v. Peacock, 654 F.2d 339, 349 n.l (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 965
(1983). The Peacock Court reasoned that the Fifth Circuit's two-prong procedure for admitting statements under rule 801(d)(2)(E) guarantees a minimum
degree of reliability that allows "a declaration to pass muster under the rule of
Ohio v. Roberts." 654 F.2d at 349 n.1. For an explanation of the Fifth Circuit's
two-prong test, see supra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
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rooted hearsay exceptions" as those exceptions that "rest upon such
solid foundations that admission of virtually any evidence within them
comports with the 'substance of the constitutional protection.' "225 The
Roberts Court went on to list examples of hearsay exceptions that provide "indicia of reliability," including dying declarations, 2 26 cross-ex228
7
amined prior testimony, 22 and business and public records.
The hearsay exceptions approved in Roberts were cited because they
encompassed inherently trustworthy declarations, not because they were
widely recognized hearsay exceptions. The Roberts Court relied on Mattox, in which the Court had reasoned that dying declarations were reliable because "the sense of impending death is presumed to remove all
temptation to falsehood, and to enforce as strict adherence to the truth
as would the obligation of an oath."'22 9 The Roberts Court itself found
that cross-examined prior trial testimony was "immune" from confrontation clause attack because it was accompanied by adequate "guarantees of truthworthiness" provided by the adversarial system.2 30 The
Roberts Court also reasoned that business and public records were reliable, citing one commentator's assertion that these are "among the safest
of the hearsay exceptions. ' 2 3' The Roberts Court noted that the hearsay
rule is riddled with exceptions developed over three centuries, 232 yet
the Court did not go so far as to suggest that all these exceptions were
"firmly rooted." Thus, it can be inferred from Roberts that the "firmly
rooted hearsay exceptions" are only those that allow the admission of
declarations which provide assurances of trustworthiness similar to
those provided by face-to-face confrontation.
The issue, therefore, is whether compliance with rule 801(d)(2)(E),
in and of itself, provides adequate assurances of reliability similar to
225. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66 (quoting Mattox, 156 U.S. at 244).
226. Id. at 66 n.8 (citing Pointer, 380 U.S. at 407; Mattox, 156 U.S. at 23334).
227. Id. (citing Mancusi, 408 U.S. at 213-16).
228. Id. (citing Comment, Hearsay, The Confrontation Guarantee and Related
Problems, 30 LA. L. REV. 651, 668 (1970)).
229. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 244.
230. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 72-73. The Roberts Court noted that prior

cross-examination allows counsel "to challenge 'whether the declarant was sincerely telling what he believed to be the truth, whether the declarant accurately
perceived and remembered the matter he related, and whether the declarant's
intended meaning is adequately conveyed by the language he employed.' " Id.
(quoting Davenport, supra note 21, at 1378).
231. 448 U.S. at 66 n.8 (quoting Comment, Hearsay, The Confrontation Guarantee and Related Problems, 30 LA. L. REV. 651,668 (1970)). One commentator has
explained that business and public records are inherently extremely reliable, "as
the danger of inaccurate memory or narrative on the part of the witness is virtually removed." Comment, Hearsay, The Confrontation Guarantee and Related
Problems, 30 LA. L. REV. 651, 668 (1970).
232. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 62. The Roberts Court also noted that the
exceptions varied in number, nature, and detail among the jurisdictions and

have been developed in a piecemeal fashion. Id.
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those provided by face-to-face confrontation. An argument in support
of the proposition that the rule provides such assurances is that the inclusion of rule 801 (d) (2) (E) in the Federal Rules of Evidence was indicative of the drafters' belief that the coconspirator hearsay rule, as
adopted, was a firmly rooted hearsay exception. 23 3 The Advisory Committee that drafted the Federal Rules of Evidence, however, expressly
considered the interrelation between the confrontation clause and the
hearsay rule and its exceptions,2 3 4 and concluded that the confrontation
clause "extends beyond the confines of the hearsay rule," and that the
hearsay rule and its exceptions as encompassed in the Federal Rules of
Evidence are to function "as an adjunct to the confrontation right in
2 35
constitutional areas."
In considering the inherent trustworthiness of statements admitted
under rule 801(d)(2)(E), it must be recognized that the coconspirator
hearsay rule was developed out of necessity and in accordance with what
was perceived to be a substantive relationship between agency and conspiracy. 2 36 Unlike the rules permitting admission of dying declarations
or prior testimony, the coconspirator hearsay rule was not developed
because it allowed the introduction of evidence which by its nature included safeguards of reliability similar to face-to-face confrontation. If
any assurances of reliability are provided by the coconspirator hearsay
rule, they are derived tangentially from the foundational requirements
23 7
of the rule.
The requirements that a statement be made "during the course and
in furtherance of a conspiracy" tend to decrease the likelihood that
statements admitted under rule 801(d) (2) (E) were made subject to faulty
recollection or with an incentive to lie. 238 The requirements do not,
however, preclude such evidentiary incompetence altogether. 23 9 The
requirement of pendency has been construed in such a way that it is
233. See United States v. Ordonez, 737 F.2d 793, 813 (9th Cir. 1984) (Norris,J., dissenting). But see United States v. Ammar, 714 F.2d 238, 255 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 936 (1983). In Ammar, the court argued that rule
801(d)(2)(E) could not be a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" because technically it was defined as non-hearsay. Id. However, this analysis would also exclude prior cross-examined testimony from the category of "firmly rooted
hearsay exceptions." See FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(l)(A). This result would be inconsistent with the guidelines addressed in Ohio v. Roberts. See 448 U.S. at 66 n.8.
234. FED. R. EvID. art. VIII advisory committee note.
235. Id. The Advisory Committee noted, however, that the hearsay rule
would operate independently of the confrontation clause in "nonconstitutional
areas." Id.
236. For a discussion of the agency and necessity rationales of conspiracy,
see supra notes 3-10 and accompanying text.
237. Davenport, supra note 21, at 1386-90.
238. Id. at 1386-88.
239. Id. at 1387-88. Davenport has noted that defects in perception, memory, and sincerity still operate to reduce reliability of statements satisfying rule
801(d)(2)(E)'s foundational requirements. Id.
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possible for a conspiracy to be deemed to continue indefinitely, and for
a coconspirator to be held accountable for statements made both before
or after his association with the conspiracy. This construction may implicate occurrences outside a criminal defendant's recollection or personal knowledge. 2 40 Although the "in furtherance" requirement was
intended to prevent the introduction of such unreliable statements as
boasts and self-serving confessions to the police, it also has been so
broadly construed by the courts that it has lost much of its
effectiveness.241
The most important assurance of reliability provided by rule
801(d)(2)(E) is the requirement that the existence of a conspiracy be
proved before a statement may be admitted into evidence. If a conspiracy is clearly demonstrated, then the possibility of defects under the "in
furtherance" and pendency requirements is diminished, 2 42 because a
trial court will be better able to accurately determine which statements
were made in furtherance of that conspiracy, when the conspiracy began
and ended, and whether the coercive effect of the ongoing nature of the
conspiracy was adequate to insure the declarant's sincerity. 24 3 The
proof of conspiracy requirement, however, has been the most erratically
enforced element of rule 801(d)(2)(E). 24 4 The federal courts have been
unable to ascertain a single, uniform standard of proof.2 4 5 Although
standards of proof are rather nebulous concepts and subject to great
flexibility in application, they may be the determinative factor in close
factual decisions. 246 The absence of a clear-cut standard of proof under
rule 801 (d)(2)(E) has led to confusion among the federal circuits, 2 4 7 and
has deprived trial judges of the guidance necessary to make close deci24 8
sions of admissibility.
An even greater problem arises when courts dispense of the re240. For a discussion of the application of the pendency requirement in the
federal courts, see supra notes 117-136 and accompanying text.
241. For a discussion of the application of the "in furtherance" requirement in the federal courts, see supra notes 137-52 and accompanying text.
242. Davenport, supra note 21, at 1388-90.
243. Id.
244. Means v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 541 (1984) (White, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari), denying cert. to 729 F.2d 1462 (6th Cir. 1984). In Means,
Justice White observed that rule 801(d)(2)(E) had "given rise to confusion
among the lower courts." 105 S. Ct. at 541 (White, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
245. 105 S. Ct. 541 (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). For a
discussion of the various standards of proof applied by the federal circuits, see
supra notes 46-71 and accompanying text.
246. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 46, at 947-48.
247. Means v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 541 (1984) (White, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari), denying cert. to 729 F.2d 1462 (6th Cir. 1984).
248. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 46, at 948. Triers of fact must be afforded
guidelines by which they may make their decisions. Id.
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quirement that conspiracy be proved by independent evidence. 2 49
Although most circuits still require that only independent evidence be
used to prove conspiracy, 25 0 in those circuits allowing consideration of
the very statements sought to be admitted 2 5 1 it is possible to bootstrap
2 52
unreliable statements of conspirators into competent evidence.
As it has been applied, rule 801(d)(2)(E) provides guarantees of reliability far less protective of the sixth amendment rights of criminal defendants than the guarantees provided by the dying declaration, prior
cross-examined testimony, and business and public records exceptions.
The only remaining argument that has been advanced in favor of treating rule 801 (d)(2)(E) as a "Firmly rooted hearsay exception" and admitting all coconspirator statements on a per se basis is that such a rule
would eliminate the need for case-by-case analysis. 25 3 In Roberts, the
Supreme Court recognized a "need for certainty in the workaday world
of conducting criminal trials." '2 54 The Court did not, however, extend
this reasoning to the point that evidence admissible under any hearsay
exceptions necessarily complies with the confrontation clause. Instead,
the Court emphasized that unavailability, and some degree of reliability,
are necessary to render a hearsay statement admissible under the con2 55
frontation clause.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The problems of reliability related to the introduction of statements
under rule 801(d)(2)(E) have evaded resolution by the federal courts.
The court of appeals have been unable to agree on a single theory of
admissibility under rule 801(d)(2)(E) or on the proper weight to be afforded coconspirator statements under the confrontation clause. In addition, the Supreme Court repeatedly has denied certiorari on these
issues, although some justices have advocated review of questions relat256
ing to the standards of reliability to be applied.
249. See Means v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 541 (1984) (White,J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (discussing the split among the circuits over the independent evidence issue), denying cert. to. 729 F.2d 1462 (6th Cir. 1984).
250. For a discussion of the requirement of independent evidence to prove
conspiracy under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), see supra note 97-116 and accompanying
text.

251. For a discussion of the circuits that have dispensed with the independent evidence requirement, see supra notes 104-07 and accompanying text.
252. See United States v. Glasser, 315 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1942) (warning
against the dangers of bootstrapping evidence under the coconspirator hearsay
rule). For a discussion of Glasser's prohibition against bootstrapping, see supra
notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
253. United States v. Ordonez, 737 F.2d 793, 812 (9th Cir. 1984) (Norris,
J., dissenting).
254. Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
255. Id.
256. See Means v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 541 (1984) (White,J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) (advocating review of foundational requirements of
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It is submitted that these issues are now ripe for review. The circuits have settled into their divergent interpretations of rule
801(d)(2)(E) and the confrontation clause. Some reliability could be afforded to coconspirator statements used at trial by identifying proper
standards and processes to be used in meeting the foundational elements of rule 801(d)(2)(E). This approach, however, would leave unresolved many reliability problems inherent in the admission of
coconspirator statements. A better approach would be to follow a confrontation clause analysis and require that all statements introduced
under rule 801 (d) (2) (E) be supported by independent indicia of reliability. The indicia of reliability analysis should not be limited to the four
criteria listed in Dutton v. Evans, but should be expanded to include all
factors relevant to the reliability of the statements sought to be introduced. 25 7 As a result, trial judges would be able to focus on the dangers
presented by coconspirator statements, prosecutors would have clear
guidelines as to the type of statements they may use, and criminal defendants would be afforded the protection guaranteed to them by the
sixth amendment.
Daniel R. Rizzolo
rule 801(d)(2)(E)), denying cert. to 729 F.2d 1462 (6th Cir. 1984); Sanson v.
United States, 104 S. Ct. 3559 (1984) (White, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (advocating review of question of whether rule 801(d)(2)(E) complies with
confrontation clause), denying cert. to. 727 F.2d 1113 (7th Cir. 1984).
257. For an illustrative list of factors that might be considered relevant to
determine reliability, see supra note 216.
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